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I. INTRODUCTION
One would think that the condition of the poor today could not
be more different than that of French peasants in 1785. Unfortu-
nately, in America today, the working poor struggle to stretch inad-
equate pay to cover the basic necessities of life such as food and
shelter. The plight of the poor in America looks all too similar to
years past. It brings to mind President Roosevelt's call for the Con-
gress to act in the face of hunger and unemployment: "We cannot
be content, no matter how high [the] general standard of living may
be; if some fraction of our people - whether it be one-third or one-
fifth or one-tenth - is ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill-housed, and insecure."1
Over two centuries ago, Thomas Jefferson described an en-
counter with a poor woman in France:
Wishing to know the condition of the laboring poor, I
entered into conversation with her, which I began by
enquiries for the path which would lead me to the
mountain: and thence proceeded to enquiries into her
vocation, condition and circumstances. She told me she
was a day laborer at 8 sous or 4d. sterling the day: that
she had two children to maintain, and to pay a rent of
30 livres for her house (which would consume the hire
of 75 days), that often she could get no employment
and of course was without bread.2
Conditions today are strikingly 'similar. The average minimum-
wage, full-time worker in America earns $6.13 an hour less than
what he would need to afford the rent on a one-bedroom apart-
ment; the difference is more than the minimum wage itself.3 A sin-
1 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to the Congress on the State of the Union
(Jan. 11, 1944), http://www.udhr.org/history/l11-44.htm (last revised Mar. 3, 2001).
2 THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 388-89 (Ad-
rienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1944) [hereinafter SELECTED WRITINGS] (Let-
ter from Thomas Jefferson to Reverend James Madison (Oct. 28, 1785)).
3 Jennifer Loven, Report Finds Rentals Out of Reach of Many Minimum
Wage Workers, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 3, 2001, at 4C (figures of "housing wage"
calculated based on the Department of Housing and Urban Development's defini-
tion of affordable housing at 30% of gross income).
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gle parent would have to work over two and one-half full-time
minimum wage jobs to afford a decent two-bedroom apartment.
4
Two and a half jobs and barely a roof over the heads of one's fam-
ily: these figures leave no room for food, let alone childcare or
healthcare, just as in France in 1785. While conditions in America in
2002 cannot be equated to eighteenth century France or the Great
Depression of Roosevelt's time, far too many people, including
children, continue to suffer. It is a disgrace that the richest country
in the world has the industrialized world's highest rates of child
poverty, hunger and homelessness. It is also a betrayal of the foun-
dations of American democracy. This rejection of economic rights
flies in the face of international law and the principles of the Decla-
ration of Independence.
In this article, I will explore the economic dimension of "the
Pursuit of Happiness" in the Declaration of Independence and how
it undercuts the notion that economic and social rights under inter-
national human rights law are somehow "un-American." The
United States has long resisted the elevation of minimum economic
needs to the status of universal human rights. American politicians
have not only largely rejected legally enforceable international
human rights agreements in general, but have been particularly an-
tagonistic to the notion that basic human rights include the right to
food, shelter or employment. The reluctance of the United States
government to embrace economic and social rights stems, in part,
from a belief that they are not truly human rights, but rather radical
entitlements initially advocated by Soviet bloc countries as a strat-
egy of the Cold War. The minimum needs conception of the pursuit
of happiness posits that economic rights are in fact enshrined in a
document widely considered part of the sacred foundation of
American democracy. 5
In Part II, I will evaluate the rejection of economic rights in the
United States, focusing on the international commitments that have
been ignored or undermined. In Part III, I will turn to the Declara-
tion of Independence, specifically, "the Pursuit of Happiness." I will
examine the potential sources and contemporary understandings of
the phrase. Drawing on eighteenth century political thought, I will
4 Id.
5 For an in-depth discussion of the remaking of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, see PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE (1998).
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assert that its inclusion was not merely a rhetorical flourish, but
rather that the pursuit of happiness established an "unalienable
right" that includes an economic dimension.
In Part IV, I will argue that the right to pursue happiness en-
tails a concomitant governmental duty. I will explore the scope of
the resulting duty, from a narrow obligation to protect individual
pursuits from external interference to a heavy, if not impossible,
burden of providing happiness. I will contend that between these
two extremes lies the most plausible interpretation: the duty to fa-
cilitate the pursuit of happiness by providing minimum economic
means. Although the Declaration of Independence has not been in-
terpreted to be legally enforceable, 6 the principles of the Declara-
tion form the basis for the government and must be followed by it. I
will show how this obligation to ensure basic economic rights is also
contained in various international instruments, most notably the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Far from being for-
eign to American political thought, the duty to facilitate the pursuit
of happiness is provided for and must be fulfilled under the princi-
ples of the Declaration of Independence.
7
II. AMERICAN REJECTION OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS
AS HUMAN RIGHTS
Despite initial support for economic rights, the United States
government has been reluctant to give minimum economic means
the status of a right. United States rates of poverty, homelessness
6 See discussion infra part IIIB.
7 This project was first suggested by Bert Lockwood at a Schell Center con-
ference at Yale Law School on incorporating international human rights law into
domestic law. Lockwood has advocated for welfare rights under state constitu-
tional provisions to happiness and safety, particularly the right to obtain happiness.
See Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., et al., Litigating State Constitutional Rights to Happi-
ness and Safety: A Strategy for Ensuring the Provision of Basic Needs to the Poor, 2
WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1 (1993); see also MORTIMER J. ADLER, WE HOLD
THESE TRUTHS: UNDERSTANDING THE IDEAS AND IDEALS OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1987) (true democracy requires both political and economic justice); Charles L.
Black, Jr., Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1114 (1986) (duty of Congress is to continually move "by
the general diffusion of welfare, to give life to a constitutional justice of livelihood,
and so to prepare the way for the 'Pursuit of Happiness' - thus taking on, as to all
the people, both of the tasks allotted to government in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence: 'to effect their safety and happiness"').
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and hunger exceed those of other industrialized countries. 8 Yet the
United States refuses to recognize that the political rights so cher-
ished by American politicians are meaningless to a child who is
hungry, or an adult who is working forty hours a week, but cannot
afford to keep a roof over her family. By contrast, economic rights
have been embraced by other countries, including those with fewer
means than the United States.9 The United States takes this to
mean that economic rights are not really rights at all, but utopian
goals for which to strive. To the contrary, in a country with the
means to fulfill economic rights, basic needs must be met. The Dec-
laration of Independence, whose principles are supposedly en-
shrined in our government and Constitution, requires that basic
needs be met to enable individuals to pursue happiness.
The United States played a pivotal role in drafting the interna-
tional documents establishing economic, social and cultural rights.
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights' ° was adopted by
the United Nations General Assembly largely as a result of United
States diplomacy, particularly by Eleanor Roosevelt." The Univer-
sal Declaration proclaimed both political and economic rights, but
the subsequent drafting of two separate protocols divided rights
into two distinct classes: civil and political rights; and economic, so-
8 The United States has the highest levels of inequality and child poverty of
all industrialized nations. CENTER FOR ECONOMIC & SOCIAL RIGHTS, HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES, http://www.cesr.org/PROGRAMS/usprogram.htm
(last visited Jan. 29, 2003); AMERICA NEEDS HUMAN RIGHTS 136 (Anuradha Mit-
tal and Peter Rosset eds., 1999); see also Ritter, J.P., Goldstein, Friedmann and
Luciano, JJ., No Child Left Behind, CONN. L. TRIB., July 15, 2002, at 19 (discussing
United States as a country with shockingly high numbers of homeless children).
9 In fact, many other countries have included economic, social and cultural
rights in their constitutions. See W. Kent Davis, Answering Justice Ginsburg's
Charge That the Constitution is "Skimpy" in Comparison to Our International
Neighbors: A Comparison of Fundamental Rights in American and Foreign Law,
39 SOUTH TEX. L. REV. 951, 968-75 (1998); Ann I. Park, Comment, Human Rights
and Basic Needs: Using International Human Rights Norms to Inform Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1195, 1196 n.1 (1987). But see, e.g., Cass R.
Sunstein, The Negative Constitution: Transition in Latin America, in TRANSITION
TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 367, 372 (Ir-
win P. Stotzky ed., 1993) (constitutions should not contain positive economic
rights).
10 G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [here-
inafter Universal Declaration].
11 See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR
ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001).
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cial, and cultural rights. 12 Although the preambles of the resulting
documents, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) 13 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 14 refer to the enjoyment of both
classes of rights, many countries have advocated and/or practiced a
division of rights. In particular, the United States has ratified the
ICCPR but remains the only major industrialized democracy that
has not ratified the ICESCR. 15
By signing the ICESCR, however, the United States "under-
took, inter alia, to guarantee 'the effective exercise' of economic,
social and cultural rights and to consider acceding to the
[ICESCR]."'16 Moreover, although the Universal Declaration is not
a binding treaty, many scholars agree that it has attained the status
of customary international law.17 Nevertheless, the United States
refuses to recognize that "economic, social and cultural rights" are
rights. 18 The United States typically deems such "so-called rights"
to be a Soviet invention,19 and instead labels them as mere "goals"
12 For a discussion of the reasons behind the split, see Linda M. Keller, The
Indivisibility of Economic and Political Rights, 1 HUM. RTs. & HUM. WELFARE 9
(July 2001), (reviewing AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM (1999)),
available at http://www.du.edu/gsis/hrhw/volumes/2001/1-3/Keller-Sen.pdf.
13 Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
14 Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
15 See Barbara Stark, Economic Rights in the United States and International
Human Rights Law: Toward an "Entirely New Strategy", 44 HASTINGS L. J. 79, 80
(1992).
16 Philip AIston, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: The Need for an Entirely New Strategy, 84 AM. J. INT'L. L. 365, 365
(1990) [hereinafter, Alston, U.S. Ratification].
17 Cf Davis, supra note 9, at 977 (Universal Declaration recognized as le-
gally binding in many countries, including United States, at least as to certain
norms like the prohibition against torture, summary execution, genocide).
18 Philip Alston, Economic and Social Rights, in HUMAN 'RIGHTS: AN
AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 137, 148 (Louis Henkin & John Lawrence Har-
grove eds., 1994) [hereinafter, Alston, Economic and Social Rights]; see also Jef-
frey L. Dunoff, Does Globalization Advance Human Rights?, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 125, 135-36 (1999).
19 See Barbara Stark, Urban Despair and Nietzsche's "Eternal Return:" From
the Municipal Rhetoric of Economic Justice to the International Law of Economic
Rights, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 185, 220 (1995) (economic rights as socialist
propaganda). Interestingly, in his 1976 book, scholar Paul Eidelberg noted that
many of the large number of Americans unfamiliar with the substance of the Dec-
laration of Independence "express hostility to its fundamental principles, regarding
them as subversive or suggestive of the teachings of Communism." PAUL
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or "aspirations. '20 United States critics of the ICESCR refer to
"red rights" 21 and the "Covenant on Uneconomic, Socialist and
Collective Rights."'2 2 Ideological opponents of the ICESCR "some-
times seem to portray it as an intrinsically un-American
enterprise.,
23
Thus, during the 1979 Senate hearings [on ratification
of the ICESCR], it was argued by one witness that the
[ICESCR] 'is largely a document of collectivist inspira-
tion, alien in spirit and philosophy to the principles of a
free economy.' An even more extreme assessment is
that the '[ICESCR] is a socialist blueprint that encour-
ages open-ended unlimited government meddling of
the sort on which dictatorships thrive.'
24
Philip Alston has pointed out that such an "attempt to discredit
these rights demonstrates an ignorance of history in general, as well
as of the history of drafting of the relevant provisions of the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights. 'Freedom from want' was in-
cluded in the Four Freedoms proclaimed by President Roosevelt
and endorsed by the Allies in the Atlantic Charter of 1941."25 In his
1941 State of the Union Address, Roosevelt declared the four es-
sential freedoms, including "freedom from want, which, translated
in world terms, means economic understandings which will secure
to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants every-
EIDELBERG, ON THE SILENCE OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE ix (1976)
(emphasis added).
20 Alston, Economic and Social Rights, supra note 18, at 148 (State Depart-
ment terminology used for economic "rights" 1981-1993). For a discussion of for-
eign policy and ICESCR, see Alston, U.S. Ratification, supra note 16, at 372-77.
21 Johan D. van der Vyver, Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century: A
Global Challenge, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 787, 799 (1994) (book review).
22 Alston, U.S. Ratification, supra note 16 at 366.
23 Id. at 383.
24 Alston, U.S. Ratification, supra note 16, at 383-84 (footnotes omitted).
25 Alston, Economic and Social Rights, supra note 18, at 142. In fact, the
United States was a proponent not only of economic rights, but also of a strong
supervisory enforcement mechanism for economic, social and cultural rights dur-
ing the drafting stage of the ICESCR. See KITTY ARAMBULO, STRENGTHENING
THE SUPERVISION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: THEORETICAL AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 28 (1999).
For further discussion by Alston of the United States origins of economic, social
and cultural rights see ALSTON, U.S. Ratification, supra note 16 at 387-88 (address-
ing support of economic rights expressed by Harry Truman, Catholic and other
churches, and other Western governments).
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where in the world. '2 6 In his 1944 State of the Union Address,
Roosevelt proposed an Economic Bill of Rights, "including many of
those economic and social rights which subsequently came to be
included in the [Universal Declaration and ICESCR]. '' 27 He
proclaimed:
This Republic had its beginning, and grew to its pre-
sent strength, under the protection of certain inaliena-
ble political rights - among them the right of free
speech, free press, free worship, trial by jury, freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures. They were
our rights to life and liberty.
As our Nation has grown in size and stature, however,
- as our industrial economy expanded - these politi-
cal rights proved inadequate to assure us equality in
pursuit of happiness.
We have come to a clear realization of the fact that
true individual freedom cannot exist without economic
security and independence. "Necessitous men are not
freemen." People who are hungry and out of a job are
the stuff of which dictatorships are made.28
As Roosevelt explicitly recognized, civil and political rights are
an inadequate basis for the pursuit of happiness. Basic economic
needs must be met to make the opportunity meaningful for all. This
realization was not unique to Roosevelt; it was inherent in the polit-
ical philosophy of the Founders.
III. A "MINIMUM NEEDS" CONCEPTION OF THE
PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS
The second paragraph of the Declaration states:
We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men
are created equal, that they are endowed by their Cre-
26 87 CONG. REC. 46-47 (1941).
27 Asbjorn Eide, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights, in
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 21, 29 (Asbojorn Eide
et al. eds., 1995).
28 90 CONG. REC. 57 (1944). For a discussion of the implementation of the
freedom from want in the context of the right to work during the New Deal and
beyond, see William P. Quigley, The Right to Work and Earn a Living Wage: A
Proposed Constitutional Amendment, 2 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 139 (1998).
564 [Vol. XIX
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ator with certain unalienable Rights; that among these
are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness. That to
secure these Rights, Governments are instituted
among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Con-
sent of the Governed, that whenever any Form of Gov-
ernment becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the
Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to in-
stitute new Government, laying its Foundation on such
Principles and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to
Them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and
Happiness.
29
A. Jefferson's Declaration of Independence
While the phrase "pursuit of happiness" is central to American
culture and frequently invoked, its meaning has never been satisfac-
torily ascertained. "In asserting the right to pursue happiness or to
pursue and obtain happiness and safety, the eighteenth-century
men asserted an absolute they failed to define. This was natural ....
For them the common sense of the matter was sufficient .... ,,30
While it may be impossible to definitively determine any one defini-
tion of "pursuit of happiness" held by all the signers of the Declara-
tion, 31 it is possible to ascertain the probable parameters of the
term. Drawing on other uses of the phrase and contemporary
sources of the meaning of happiness, I argue that a plausible inter-
pretation of pursuit of happiness includes an economic dimension.
As recent scholarship has emphasized, Thomas Jefferson was
not the sole author of the Declaration of Independence, 32 nor were
29 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) reprinted in
ALLEN JAYNE, JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: ORIGINS, PHILOS-
OPHY AND THEOLOGY, app. at 178 (1998) (text is "The First Printing of the Decla-
ration of Independence, as inserted in the Rough Journal of Congress[.]").
30 HOWARD MUMFORD JONES, THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 99 (1953).
31 See, e.g., id. at 15 ("by no means easy" to ascertain meaning of pursuit of
happiness); JEAN M. YARBROUGH, AMERICAN VIRTUES: THOMAS JEFFERSON ON
THE CHARACTER OF A FREE PEOPLE 14 (1998) ("Jefferson never systematically
explores what he means by happiness in general or the pursuit of happiness in
particular").
32 See, e.g., MAIER, supra note 5, at 98 (discussing Committee of Five
charged with drafting the declaration in addition to role of whole Congress as
editors).
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its ideas original to him.33 Nevertheless, "[i]n the end, the draft
Declaration of Independence submitted to Congress by the Com-
mittee of Five was so much the work of Thomas Jefferson that it can
justly be called 'Jefferson's draft."' 34 While other passages were
substantively changed prior to adoption by Congress, the pursuit of
happiness language was not significantly altered.35 Therefore, it is
possible to use Jefferson as a proxy for the Congress and more
broadly, the people, given that the Declaration was meant to em-
body the sentiments of the public.36 Jefferson later explained the
purpose of his draft:
Neither aiming at originality of principle or sentiment,
nor yet copied from any particular and previous writ-
ing, it was intended to be an expression of the Ameri-
can mind, and to give to that expression the proper
tone and spirit called for by the occasion. All its au-
thority rests then on the harmonizing sentiments of the
day, whether expressed in conversation, in letters,
printed essays, or in the elementary books of public
right, as Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Sidney, &c. 37
The sources upon which Jefferson drew are a subject of much
controversy. 38 Nonetheless, most commentators agree that Jeffer-
son was influenced by the writings of contemporaries such as fellow
Virginian George Mason and Pennsylvanian James Wilson, as well
as political philosophers like John Locke and assorted "moral
33 See, e.g., JAYNE, supra note 29, at 1 (Jefferson not originator of ideas or
ideals).
34 MAIER, supra note 5, at 105.
35 The following changes were made: "inherent and inalienable rights" was
changed to "certain inalienable rights" by Congress; "inalienable" became
"unalienable" in the printed version. MAIER, supra note 5, app. C. at 236.
36 But cf. Joseph R. Grodin, Rediscovering the State Constitutional Right to
Happiness and Safety, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 1, 8-9 (1997) (state constitutions
based "happiness" provisions on Virginia Declaration, not Declaration of Indepen-
dence, so proper source to explore is George Mason, not Thomas Jefferson). Ma-
son's sources, like Jefferson's, include Aristotle, Locke, Hutcheson, Burlemaqui
and Wilson. Id. at 11-16.
37 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee (May 8, 1825), in 10 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 1816-1.826 343 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1899).
38 Compare GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARA-
TION OF INDEPENDENCE (1978), with Ronald Hamowy, Jefferson and the Scottish
Enlightenment: A Critique of Garry Wills's Inventing America: Jefferson's Decla-
ration of Independence, 16 WM. & MARY Q. 503 (1979).
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sense" theorists. 39 As illustrated above, Jefferson himself rejected
any claim on originality of concept and credited various sources for
the Declaration.40
B. The Substantive Meaning of Pursuit of Happiness
Happiness was one of the most central concepts in eighteenth-
century thought. "The notion was generally accepted by Americans
of the revolutionary period, and there is no record of any question
raised in regard to it in the convention which voted on the Declara-
tion."'41 Illustrating the prevalence of happiness, one author refers
to the widespread belief as "the religion of happiness. ' 42 Discus-
sions of happiness in philosophy, novels, plays, poems and treatises
mark a generation "obsessed" with happiness.43 The frequent pres-
ence of happiness in literature of the period illustrates "just how
widespread was this preoccupation with happiness, and although
the precise phrase itself has not been found, the idea that temporal
happiness is something to be actively sought after appears in innu-
merable variations. '44 References to the pursuit of happiness "ap-
peared with sufficient frequency in earlier European writings that
Jefferson almost certainly encountered it"45 prior to drafting the
Declaration. "In fact, references to happiness as a political goal are
39 While several other sources are plausible, a survey of the literature finds
that commentators agree at least that Jefferson was aware of the writings of these
men and, to varying degrees, agree on their influence on Jefferson. See discussion
infra. For a review of the literature on the political theory of the Declaration, di-
vided into Lockean orthodox and revisionary interpretations, see JAYNE, supra
note 29, at 1-6.
40 This is not to say that Jefferson shied away from taking credit for the Dec-
laration. To the contrary, it is the first thing he wished to be included in his epitaph
("Here was buried Thomas Jefferson Author of the Declaration of American Inde-
pendence[,] of the Statute of Virginia for religious freedom & Father of the Uni-
versity of Virginia"). See MAIER, supra note 5, at 186.
41 CHARLES MAURICE WILTSE, THE JEFFERSONIAN TRADITION IN AMERI-
CAN DEMOCRACY 70 (1935).
42 HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, JEFFERSON, NATIONALISM AND THE EN-
LIGHTENMENT 93 (1975); see also Herbert Lawrence Ganter, Jefferson's 'Pursuit of
Happiness' and Some Forgotten Men (Second Installment), 16 WM. & MARY Q.
558, 584 n. 81 (1936) (discussing "several famous books which are related to the
happiness doctrine").
43 COMMAGER, supra note 42, at 94.
44 Ganter, supra note 42, at 577-82 (giving examples from Alexander Pope,
Bolingbroke, Francis Hutcheson, and Lord Kames).
45 MAIER, supra note 5, at 134.
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everywhere in American political writings as well, as anyone can
see who bothers to look."
46
According to Jefferson, "the only orthodox object of the insti-
tution of government is to secure the greatest degree of happiness
possible to the general mass of those associated under it."'47 The
Declaration enshrines this view by stating that governments are cre-
ated in order to secure rights including that of pursuing happiness. 48
It was a common belief in the eighteenth century that man fell short
of achieving happiness because government, religion, society and
other institutions of civilization worked to prevent it.49 The govern-
ment envisioned in the Declaration, by contrast, would further the
right to pursue happiness.
Given the contemporary emphasis on happiness and happi-
ness' status as an end of government, it seems clear that "happiness
was not for Jefferson merely some kind of pleasant sensation. '50
"When Jefferson spoke of pursuing happiness, he had nothing
vague or private in mind. He meant a public happiness that is mea-
surable; which is, indeed, the test and justification of any govern-
ment."5' Moreover, happiness was "not merely a moral but a legal
right."'52 In eighteenth-century America, happiness was considered
"the will of nature and of God. Clearly, it is a duty of government
and a right of man."'53 The meaning of happiness in eighteenth-cen-
tury colonial and European culture, unlike today, was profound.
That profound meaning must be recaptured. American politicians
must once again focus on happiness as a fundamental aim of gov-
ernment, particularly as it relates to the basic needs of the people.
46 Id.
47 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Francis A Venaderkemp (Mar. 22, 1812),
in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 58 (Edward Dumbauld ed.,
1955).
48 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776), reprinted in
JAYNE, supra note 29.
49 COMMAGER, supra note 42, at 96.
50 WALTER BERNS, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY 41 (1987).
51 WILLS, supra note 38, at 164.
52 COMMAGER, supra note 42, at 110.
53 Id. at 107.
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C. Sources & Prior Uses of Happiness
1. Classical Influences
Jefferson was well versed in classical philosophy, as were his
contemporaries, and the Declaration built on that foundation of
knowledge.5 4 Indeed, Jefferson specifically referred to Aristotle as
one of the sources of the Declaration. 55 In classical Greek philoso-
phy, happiness was a central tenet of both Platonic and Aristotelian
philosophy. According to Plato, happiness is commensurate with
justice - a state where all four components of the soul are working
in harmony.56 Plato's parallels of a just man and a just city indicate
that happiness is both a private and a public notion. Public happi-
ness consists in the greatest happiness for the whole city, rather
than incredible happiness for one group. Private happiness is the
province of the just man. 57 In Aristotle's conception, a proper view
of happiness consists in rational desires controlling and organizing
non-rational desires. To oversimplify, happiness is the golden mean:
moderation. 5
8
Aristotelian happiness is "a core concept in defining both
human perfection and the goal of community. '59 "The end (goal) of
the best constitution is happiness, defined as 'the perfect [or com-
plete] activity and employment of virtue.' . . . Aristotle's theory of
government also entails the concept of mutual, rather than solely
individual, advantage. ' 60 This connection between the goal of gov-
ernment and virtue was echoed by many of Jefferson's contempo-
raries. For example, Adam Smith wrote: "All constitutions of
government ... are valued only in proportion as they tend to pro-
mote the happiness of those who live under them. This is their sole
54 Cf Grodin, supra note 36, at 11 (discussing "well-read and thoughtful"
leaders of American revolution and strands of classical and enlightenment thought
relevant to happiness). Jefferson apparently owned a copy of William Ellis' English
translation of Aristotle's Politics, published in 1776. See Ganter, supra note 42, at
584 n. 81.
55 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee, supra note 37.
56 PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, 427e (trans. by G.M.A. Grube, 1974) ("I think our
city.., is completely good.... Clearly, then, it is wise, courageous, moderate, and
just.").
57 See id. at 420b.
58 See TERENCE IRWIN, CLASSICAL THOUGHT 135-37 (1989). Although Jef-
ferson criticized Plato, he adopted Aristotle's happiness as a public good, with
temporary desires being restrained by virtue. See discussion infra Part 11D2.
59 Grodin, supra note 36, at 11.
60 Id. at 11-12 (alterations in original).
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use and end.''61 Smith drew from Cicero and Epicures to conclude
that "virtue alone is sufficient to secure happiness.
'62
2. Eighteenth Century Political Philosophy
Jefferson's contemporaries not only discussed happiness as a
philosophical concept, but also incorporated it into political docu-
ments. "In writing in the Declaration that the pursuit of happiness
is a natural right... Jefferson was stating a central tenet of eight-
eenth-century political philosophy." 63 John Adams, in his 1776
Thoughts on Government, wrote that the "happiness of society is
the end of government, as... happiness of the individual is the end
of man."'64 Like Aristotle and Smith, Adams connected happiness
and virtue.
The happiness of the people was the purpose of gov-
ernment, [Adams] wrote, and therefore that form of
government was best which produced the greatest
amount of happiness for the largest number. And since
'all sober inquirers after truth' agreed that happiness
derived from virtue, that form of government with vir-
tue at its foundation was more likely than any other to
promote the general happiness.65
George Mason's draft of the Virginia Declaration of Rights
was obviously a document with which Jefferson would have been
familiar. Indeed, this document is considered a primary source of
influence66 and is thought to be one of the few materials Jefferson
did refer to while drafting the Declaration.67 The first clause of the
Virginia Declaration of Rights provides:
61 Ganter, supra note 42, at 575 (quoting ADAM SMITH, The Effect of Utility,
in THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS, pt. IV, ch. 1, at 266 (Henry G. Bohn ed.,
1853)). Smith's book was published in 1776. Id. at 584 n.81.
62 Id. at 577 n.73 (quoting SMITH, supra note 61, pt. VII, § 2, at 451).
63 SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARA-
TION OF INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 53 (1995).
64 Id. at 54.
65 DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 102 (2001).
66 Hamowy, supra note 38, at 518 n.57.
67 MAIER, supra note 5, at 125-26 (Jefferson referred to the Virginia Declara-
tion and his own draft Constitution for Virginia). But see JAYNE, supra note 29, at
132 ("Indeed the fact that [Jefferson] did not include 'obtaining happiness' as a
right indicates that he was not influenced by Mason's Virginia Declaration of
Rights when drafting the Declaration of Independence.").
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1. That all men are by nature equally free and
independent, and have certain inherent rights, of
which, when they enter into society, they cannot by any
compact deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquir-
ing and possessing property, and pursuing and ob-
taining happiness'and safety.
68
As the similar wording of the two declarations indicates, Jefferson
was almost certainly influenced by Mason's use of happiness. There
are obvious differences between the two declarations with respect
to the right to property and the "obtaining" of happiness. The sig-
nificance, if any, of Jefferson's replacement of property with pursuit
of happiness and the omission of "obtaining" will be discussed sub-
sequent to the survey of possible sources.
James Wilson's essay, Considerations on the Nature and Extent
of the Legislative Authority of the British Parliament [hereinafter,
Considerations], is an even earlier example of happiness as a politi-
cal doctrine. Parts of the essay are found in Jefferson's Common-
place Book69 and Wilson is considered one of the most influential
proponents of the moral sense school.70 Written in 1774, Wilson's
essay concluded that the "happiness of the society is the first law of
every government. '71 He further stated that those who give consent
to be governed do so "with a view to ensure and to increase [my
emphasis] the happiness of the governed above what they could en-
joy in an independent and unconnected state of nature. ' 72 He es-
tablished the happiness of the colonies as the benchmark for
legitimacy of parliamentary control. To support his proposition,
Wilson cites Jean-Jacques Burlemaqui.
73
3. Moral Sense Theorists
Moral sense theorists such as Burlemaqui posit that morality is
ruled by a faculty similar to the five senses of the body. This sense,
without innate knowledge, makes "a determination of our minds to
6 GERBER, supra note 63, at 90-91 (emphasis added).
69 MORTON GABRIEL WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 252 (1978).
70 See Grodin, supra note 36, at 15.
71 Id.
72 WHITE, supra note 69 at 252 (alteration in original).
73 See id. at 251. Although Burlemaqui was Swiss, he is associated with the
moral sense theory of the Scottish Enlightenment. Id.
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receive amiable or disagreeable ideas of actions, when they occur to
our observation, antecedent to any opinions of advantage or loss to
redound to ourselves from them. '74 There is much debate over the
influence of moral sense theory, also referred to as the Scottish En-
lightenment, on the Declaration. This is particularly so in terms of
comparing it to Locke's influence. Morton White, in his influential
book The Philosophy of the American Revolution, contends that the
doctrine of moral sense must be considered given the references to
moral sense in the writings of Jefferson, Wilson and Adams.75
White argues that the Declaration accepts a hybrid doctrine of
moral sense and Lockean reason put forth by Burlemaqui. 76 Other
scholars argue that while there are references to moral sense theory
in the writings of Jefferson and others, the Declaration relies solely
on Locke. 77 While it is unclear how long Jefferson subscribed to
moral sense theory,78 it is reasonably certain that the writings of the
moral sense school are sources of Jefferson's conception of
happiness.
a. Jean-Jacques Burlemaqui
Burlemaqui attempted to reconcile moral sense with rational-
ism, a synthesis that was probably attractive to Jefferson.79 Accord-
ing to Burlemaqui, moral sense indicates or intimates certain moral
principles, but it is the task of Lockean reason to confirm or estab-
lish those principles. 80 Burlemaqui perceived reason as verifying
what the moral sense first calls to attention; "one gives the first no-
tice, the other verifies and proves it.' '81
According to White, Burlemaqui may have provided the sub-
structure for the right to pursue happiness.82 Burlemaqui posits that
if one has a duty, a right must follow. 83 Thus if God gave man the
desire for happiness, he must pursue happiness, and therefore must
have the right to such pursuit.84 Similarly, since God made life a
74 Id. at 102.
75 Id. at 97.
76 See id. at 100.
77 See GERBER, supra note 63, at 49-50.
78 Cf. WHITE, supra note 69, at 114-127.
79 See id. at 107.
80 Id. at 100.
81 Id at 112. (quoting Jean-Jacques Burlemaqui, Principles of Natural Law).
82 Id. at 163.
83 Id. at 165.
8 Id.
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part of the essence of man, preservation of life must be an end of
man, for God does nothing in vain.85 Thus, God wills that man pre-
serve his life.86 If God wills it, then man has a duty to preserve
life.87 Given this duty to preserve life, man must have the right to
preserve life. 88 Therefore, "we have arrived at Jefferson's belief that
the right to preserve life is 'derived' from the creation of man."8 9
The desire to pursue happiness is also part of the created essence of
man, according to Burlemaqui. 90 "To make a long story less long,
we state only the conclusion: since God made the desire for happi-
ness a part of man's essence, man has a duty and a right to pursue
happiness."91 In other words, "[a] human creature of God is also
one who has been given the essential desire for happiness, and from
this Jefferson may derive the self-regarding duty and right to pursue
one's happiness. ' 92 Thus, Burlemaqui may have provided the rea-
soning for Jefferson's right to pursue happiness.
White's theory of a strong connection between Burlemaqui
and Jefferson has been criticized, however. According to Allen
Jayne, there is "little evidence to support White's opinion that Jef-
ferson was influenced by Jean-Jacques Burlemaqui when he wrote
the Declaration. '93 There is no evidence indicating that Jefferson
read or recommended Burlemaqui's books. Moreover, according to
Jayne, Jefferson rejected Burlemaqui's conception of rights as du-
ties derived from the nature of man and God; by contrast, Jefferson
conceived rights as part of man's inner nature.
94
While there is no direct evidence Jefferson relied on Burlema-
qui's argument as elucidated above, it does provide a cogent expla-
nation for the derivation of the rights to life and to pursue
happiness from the Creator. Also, it is not improbable that Jeffer-
son was aware of Burlemaqui's argument; if nothing more, Jeffer-
son was likely aware of the Burlemaquian background of Wilson's
argument in Considerations. Moreover, Jefferson - along with Wil-






90 Id. at 166.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 167.
93 JAYNE, supra note 29, at 73-74.
94 Id. at 73, 127.
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Enlightenment philosophers. 95 As discussed below, Jayne agrees
that Jefferson was influenced by other moral sense theorists such as
Lord Kames, who in turn was influenced by Francis Hutcheson. 96
b. Francis Hutcheson
Another philosopher of the moral sense school, Hutcheson be-
lieved that happiness was necessarily derived from providing happi-
ness to others. In order to achieve private happiness, one should
take publicly useful actions.97 Hutcheson believed, as Jefferson did,
that "the general happiness is the supreme end of all political
union." 98 Despite this similarity, the influence of Hutcheson on Jef-
ferson has been called into question, largely in response to Garry
Wills' almost exclusive reliance on Hutcheson as Jefferson's
source.99 In his critique of Wills' argument, for instance, Ronald
Hamowy asks:
What evidence is adduced that Jefferson had the Scot-
tish philosophers, specifically Hutcheson, in mind
when writing the Declaration? There is none. Indeed,
Hutcheson, who among the Scots comes closest in his
views to those expressed in the Declaration, is not once
quoted, cited, referred to, or recommended, in any
connection, in any of Jefferson's writings.
100
On the other hand, Hamowy recognizes that "[t]here is no reason
to doubt Wills' contention that Jefferson was closely acquainted
with the Scottish moral philosophers. In fact, it would be surprising
if he were not."'101 While Wills may go too far in relying on Hutche-
son to the extent that he appears to deny the influence of all else,
Jefferson was aware of the works of the Scottish 
Enlightenment.
Jefferson agreed with the elevation of happiness to an end of gov-
ernment central to the Scottish philosophers as well as seminal En-
glish works. There is no need, nor any reason, to choose between
95 MCCULLOUGH, supra note 65, at 121.
96 JAYNE, supra note 29, at 66.
97 WILLS, supra note 38, at 252.
98 Id. at 252.
99 See id.
100 Hamowy, supra note 38, at 514.
101 Id. at 505.
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Henry Home, Lord Kames, was also influenced by Locke. Jef-
ferson admired Kames and copied some of Kames' writings into his
Commonplace Book.10 3 Like Hutcheson and Burlemaqui, Kames
believed in the moral sense; he also linked the moral sense to ra-
tional judgment. 10 4 According to Jayne, Jefferson could have drawn
his belief in rational judgment from either Kames or Locke. 10 5 Both
believed that morality could be increased by using rational judg-
ment to maximize happiness.
0 6
It is clear that Jefferson was influenced by the moral sense
school, whether embodied in the writings of Burlemaqui, Hutche-
son, Kames or some combination thereof. Some have argued, how-
ever, that Jefferson did not subscribe to moral sense theory in the
Declaration. For example, Scott Douglas Gerber concedes that
moral sense theory is found in the writings of Jefferson, as well as
Adams and Wilson.10 7 "In the Declaration, however, all reference
to moral sense is omitted. What this suggests is that the Declaration
relies solely upon Locke's theory of knowledge [regarding self-evi-
dent truths]." 10 8 Similarly, Garrett Ward Sheldon asserts that Jeffer-
son's belief in the moral sense antedates the Declaration. 0 9
Sheldon specifically criticizes Wills: "the brilliant flaw in his argu-
ment is that the moral sense philosophy appeared not in Jefferson's
revolutionary writings, but in his post-revolutionary political philos-
ophy. ...
These criticisms fail to acknowledge other evidence of Jeffer-
son's early belief in the moral sense. Jefferson's 1771 letter to Rob-
ert Skipwith recommends moral sense theorists such as Lord
102 GERBER, supra note 63, at 27 n., (discussing Hamowy on Wills).
103 JEAN M. YARBROUGH, AMERICAN VIRTUES: THOMAS JEFFERSON ON THE
CHARACTER OF A FREE PEOPLE 4 (1998).
104 JAYNE, supra note 29, at 134-35.
105 Id at 135.
106 Id.
107 GERBER, supra note 63, at 50.
108 Id.
109 See GARRETT WARD SHELDON, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 53-60 (1991).
110 Id. at 155.
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Kames. 111 In his autobiography, Jefferson cites William Small as an
influence; Small, who taught at William & Mary in 1770, was a
product of the Scottish Enlightenment.11 2 "Thus, it is likely that Jef-
ferson was already familiar with moral sense philosophy when he
wrote the Declaration." 113 Jefferson therefore probably drew from
the moral sense school in forming his belief in happiness as an end
in government and as a right linked to virtue and public life.
4. John Locke
Jefferson's interpretation of happiness was also likely influ-
enced by Locke. Although Jefferson apparently rejected the Lock-
ean notion of rational judgment as the province of a few, there is no
doubt that Locke's political theory made an impact on Jefferson.
The Lockean roots of American political thought, and Jefferson's
writings, are well known. The phrasing and conceptions contained
in the Declaration are clearly linked to Locke's Second Treatise.
114
Writing on the sources for the Declaration, Jefferson himself re-
ferred to Locke.' 5 Moreover, "at least during the first half of the
eighteenth century - the Lockean perspective on government and
revolution was so commonplace that little if any intellectual dispute
surrounded it. ''116
The Declaration made "commonsense moral arguments under-
standable to virtually everyone" and was drafted to reflect the com-
mon sense of the people.117 Jefferson believed that minimal reason,
accessible to most people, could discern right from wrong. He
therefore did not embrace the Lockean belief that only a few could
comprehend the necessary complex "rational demonstrations."11 8
This aspect, however, is the only Lockean principle rejected in the
Declaration. 19 In fact, the Lockean influence on the Declaration
was so strong that "fellow Virginian Richard Henry Lee had said
III YARBROUGH, supra note 103, at 17.
112 JAYNE, supra note 29, at 19.
113 YARBROUGH, supra note 103, at 18.
114 See, e.g., Hamowy, supra note 38, at 507-08 (textual parallels between the
Declaration and the Second Treatise).
115 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee, supra note 37 and ac-
companying text.
116 Hamowy, supra note 38, at 505.
117 JAYNE, supra note 29, at 76.
118 Id.
119 Cf id. at 77. The omission of property will be discussed below.
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that it had 'been copied from Locke's treatise on government."'
120
Scholars have debated the impact of Locke on the Declaration,
with some "widely exaggerating" and others "unjustifiably trivial-
izing" Locke's influence. 121 "The evidence from Jefferson's own
writings, however, is that Locke was among the more influential
authors whom Jefferson read."'1 22 In particular, the Declaration was
"substantially influenced by John Locke's Second Treatise. '1 23
Many passages from the Declaration are "strikingly similar" if not
identical to parts of the Second Treatise, and the same themes reso-
nate in both pieces.
124
Despite the strong Lockean influence, the use of the phrase
"the Pursuit of Happiness" was a change from Locke's traditional
triumvirate of life, liberty and property. By replacing property with
pursuit of happiness, it is unlikely that Jefferson intended to repudi-
ate property rights. "On the contrary, he believed in them so
strongly as facilitators both of republican virtue and of the individ-
ual pursuit of happiness that he wanted their widest practical distri-
bution." 125 Therefore, as discussed below, the absence of property
does not represent a rejection of Locke. 126
120 JAY FLIEGELMAN, DECLARING INDEPENDENCE: JEFFERSON, NATURAL
LANGUAGE & THE CULTURE OF PERFORMANCE 164 (1993).
121 DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFER-
SON 21 (1994).
122 Id.
123 SHELDON, supra note 109, at 42.
124 GERBER, supra note 63, at 30-31; see also JAYNE, supra note 29, at 45.
Jayne discusses many of the parallels in a level of detail beyond the scope of this
article. See JAYNE, supra note 29, at 41-61.
125 JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS & STEWART BURNS, A PEOPLE'S CHARTER:
THE PURSUIT OF RIGHTS IN AMERICA 89 (1991).
126 To the contrary, Jefferson was simply condensing the same sentiments. See
STEPHEN E. LUCAS, THE STYLISTIC ARTISTRY OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPEN-
DENCE 4, http://www.archives.gov/exhibithall/chartersof_freedomldeclaration/
declaration-style.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2003) ("The preamble ... capsulizes in
five sentences-202 words- what it took John Locke thousands of words to ex-
plain in his Second Treatise of Government."), derived from Stephen E. Lucas,
"Justifying America: The Declaration of Independence as a Rhetorical Document,"
in AMERICAN RHETORIC: CONTEXT AND CRITICISM (Thomas Benson ed., 1989);
see also A Crusade Against Ignorance: Letter to George Wythe, August 13, 1786, in
LETTERS: THOMAS JEFFERSON 1743-1826 858 (1993), available at http://etext.lib.
virginia.edu/etcbin/toccernew2?id=jefLett.sgm&images/modeng&data=texts/en-
glish/modeng/parsed&tag=public&part=47&division=div1 ("I think the beauty of
a motto is to condense much matter in as few words as possible. The word omitted
will be supplied by every reader.").
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Given the strong support for a Lockean influence on Jeffer-
son's thought, it is unfortunate that Locke's conception of happi-
ness is not very well developed. Locke described happiness as
"sensible pleasure."' 27 Locke also equated happiness with the de-
sire to avoid pain and to seek pleasure.1 28 There is no one path to
happiness, but rather a "diversity" in each individual's right to pur-
sue happiness. 129 In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,
Locke describes happiness as the utmost pleasure and the "great
end" of all, as all men desire happiness and devote themselves to its
pursuit. 130 Happiness is "elusive" because no man can entirely rid
himself of the "uneasiness" of mind stemming from the lack of
some good; there are "multiple uneasinesses" because men do not
desire the same goods equally; hence, the use of the term "pur-
suit.' 3 1 Moreover, changed circumstances influence pleasure and
pain, thus putting happiness in "a state of flux" and leaving men "in
constant search for different pleasures in their 'pursuit of happi-
ness.'" 132 Locke believed that one could control the will to force a
focus on remote good, rather than immediate pleasure, which might
be detrimental to long-term happiness. 133 Thus, Lockean happiness
was more than simply fulfilling one's desires; what exactly that en-
tailed is less clear but it seems that Jefferson could have drawn on
both Locke and the moral sense theorists to arrive at a right to
happiness, which involves constant striving and virtuous restraint.
D. Possible Interpretations of Happiness
Like Locke, Jefferson believed that happiness depends on the
individual and his place. 134 In his Notes on the State of Virginia, Jef-
ferson discusses public education as a means to teach individuals to
work out their own greatest happiness. 135 Thus, it seems that Jeffer-
son agrees with Locke that there is no one path or bundle of goods
that will provide all men with happiness. But the vast majority of
Jefferson's references to happiness are in private correspondence
127 WILLS, supra note 38, at 250.
128 YARBROUGH, supra note 103, at 4.
129 JONES, supra note 30, at 95.
130 JAYNE, supra note 29, at 129-30.
131 See id. at 130-31.
132 Id. at 132.
133 See id. at 132-33.
134 See MAYER, supra note 121.
135 JAYNE, supra note 29, at 132.
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where the meaning of happiness is treated casually. 136 By examin-
ing Jefferson's political philosophy, however, some parameters of
happiness emerge: it includes property and it is inextricably inter-
twined with virtue.
1. Property as Part of the Pursuit of Happiness
The substitution of pursuit of happiness for property can be
explained in terms of the inalienability and importance of the
rights. "In practice, pursuit of happiness will be the pursuit of prop-
erty, for even though property is less valuable than life or liberty, it
serves as a guard for them."'1 37 Life, liberty and pursuit of happiness
in the Declaration are the natural rights "for the sake of which
Americans established a Constitution. '" 138 Property, by contrast, is
not a natural or inalienable right.
Property is not a natural right because "exclusive and stable
ownership" is impossible in early, primitive societies. 39 "In the ear-
liest societies, property, whether 'fixed or movable,' belongs to an
individual only as long as he is in direct possession or occupancy
and, it would seem, is able to defend his position.' 140 Private prop-
erty with secure, exclusive ownership "comes into existence only
with the emergence of agriculture, which comes relatively 'late in
the progress of society' and, far from being the natural or original
condition, is the 'gift of social law."141 Property is, nevertheless,
grounded in "natural wants" and "needs. ' 142 It is an important
right, but it does not fit in with the other "inalienable" natural
rights listed in the Declaration.
143
"The inherent right to pursue happiness probably also included
'the means of acquiring and possessing property,' but not the own-
ership of specific things since property can be sold and is therefore
136 See YARBROUGH, supra note 103, at 15.
137 Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Responsibility versus Self-Expression, in OLD
RIGHTS AND NEW 96, 98 (Robert A. Licht ed., 1993).
138 Id.
139 YARBROUGH, supra note 103, at 89-90; see also MAYER, supra note 121, at
80 (property as derived from "secondary natural law," not inherent right as in Dec-
laration); JAYNE, supra note 29, at 120 (property of movable goods and land is not
part of oneself and can be alienated).
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alienable."'1 44 The right to property may be incorporated through
the inalienable right to pursue happiness because it is crucial to im-
plementing the pursuit of happiness. 145 The possession of income-
producing property may be the tool with which to realize both the
right to the pursuit of happiness and the right to life. 146 Such prop-
erty may encompass more than land, reaching to items such as du-
rable goods and the like. 147 Because Jefferson thought of a farming
society with limited population and low immigration as an ideal,148
it is likely that he considered property, particularly land, to be part
of happiness.
"Moreover, 'the pursuit of happiness' was considered by both
Locke and the Founders to be synonymous with 'property,' when
property is conceived in a broad sense, rather than simply as the
ownership of material goods. According to Locke, 'Property . . .
must be understood ... to mean that property which men have in
their persons as well as goods."' 149 For example, a man has prop-
erty in his person "in the faculties that he can employ to make the
earth more productive." 150
Thus, the right to property may simply be subsumed under the
pursuit of happiness. This is not to say that happiness is equivalent
to property. As the separation of the two concepts in Mason's dec-
laration and in Locke's writing shows, property is not the same
thing as happiness. It may be, however, that the right to property is
justified by its service to the pursuit of happiness151 Similarly,
based on Mason's wording, the right to property might be brought
in under liberty, not happiness.152 Regardless of the means, it ap-
pears that the right to property was incorporated into the Declara-
tion. If the right to property were part of liberty and/or happiness,
there would be no need to explicitly refer to it, particularly when it
does not stand alone as a natural or inalienable right.
144 MAIER, supra note 5.
145 MORTIMER J. ADLER, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: UNDERSTANDING THE
IDEAS AND IDEALS OF THE CONSTITUTION 152 (1987).
146 Id.
147 Id. at 91.
148 BURNS & BURNS, supra note 125, at 164.
149 GERBER, supra note 63, at 28 (footnote omitted).
150 ADRIENNE KOCH, JEFFERSON & MADISON: THE GREAT COLLABORATION
79 (1964).
151 See id. at 78-79.
152 See supra text accompanying note 67-68.
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In addition, the language of the Declaration (i.e., the replacing
of property with pursuit of happiness) can be explained in part as a
rhetorical strategy. At the most basic level, the substitution reads
more appealingly. 153 The pursuit of happiness is a phrase that many
individuals would find comfortable and attractive, more so than the
"uninspiring and legalistic" property. 5 4 Pursuit of happiness sounds
like a loftier goal than property. Though perhaps the assessment is
clouded by hindsight, the phrasing simply sounds better when read
aloud; the intonation of ending with happiness rather than property
seems to close on a more uplifting note. The change may have also
been made in order to give the colonists a stronger moral case
against the British.
155
By replacing property with happiness in the ancient
trinity, by making not merely the security of posses-
sions but the larger quality of people's lives, the effect
of government on their happiness, the 'hard political
test of any reign's very legitimacy,' Jefferson trans-
formed the American case against British rule into a
deeply moral cause.
156
While Jefferson most likely took these stylistic and strategic
considerations into account, it is probable that the replacement had
a more profound meaning as well. Given Jefferson's belief in prop-.
erty rights, it is unlikely that he meant to downgrade or exclude
them altogether. Hence, the conception of happiness as encompass-
ing property rights seems the most plausible. The pursuit of happi-
ness therefore has an economic dimension in that it includes
property rights, providing the first part of a meaningful conception
of pursuit of happiness.
2. Psychological v. Ethical Views
The second part of happiness involves virtue or the "ethical"
interpretation of happiness. Scholar Mortimer Adler has catego-
rized happiness into the modern psychological view and the ethical
view. 157 An individual has attained happiness under the psychologi-
153 GERBER, supra note 63, at 45.
154 KOCH, supra note 150, at 80.
155 BURNS & BURNS, supra note 125, at 42.
156 Id.
157 ADLER, supra note 145, at 52. This exploration of the meaning of happi-
ness and its implications for economic rights owes a debt to Adler's discussion of
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cal view when he has reached a state of satisfaction or contentment
by fulfilling desires. 158 In the ethical conception, happiness is more
than mere satisfaction; it encompasses the enrichment of an individ-
ual's life by cumulative possession of goods that a morally virtuous
person ought to desire.'5 9 "[T]his pursuit of happiness, which goes
beyond the happiness invoked by Wilson in his Considerations, can
only be subjective and is never attained once and for all.' 160 The
ethical conception posits that a whole life well-lived fosters a feeling
of contentment. Far from being a pleasant sensation, happiness in
the ethical conception is imbued with a normative element. By con-
trast, the modern psychological conception conceives of happiness
as a feeling of contentment or satisfaction achieved by fulfilling
desires, regardless of ethical considerations. 161
The modern psychological view may be reflected in Ronald
Hamowy's interpretation of happiness, although he does not refer
to it as such. Hamowy has put forth a theory that he deems to be
the only one consistent with Jefferson's views of individual auton-
omy and with the structure and language of the Declaration. Ac-
cording to Hamowy, Jefferson meant the following:
[M]en may act as they choose in their search for ease,
comfort, felicity, and grace, either by owning property
or not, by accumulating wealth or distributing it, by
opting for material success or asceticism, in a word, by
determining the path to their own earthly and heavenly
salvation as they alone see fit.
162
In the last clause, Hamowy seems to imply that one may do
whatever one wants to achieve happiness, regardless of its effects
the Declaration and his argument for moving from political to economic rights; I
argue, however, that economic rights were inherent in the Declaration while Adler
maintains that the Founders had no conception of economic rights. See id. at 132-
133 (18th century statesmen as well as 19th century descendants "were blind to the
existence of economic rights in the inventory of inalienable human rights").
158 Id. at 52.
159 Id. The ethical view encompasses the psychological view when the satis-
faction of desires involve those desires that a person does and ought to desire. Id.
at 53.
160 DICK HOWARD, THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1763-
1787 64 (1989).
161 ADLER, supra note 145, at 53.
162 Hamowy, supra note 38, at 519.
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on others. Given Jefferson's belief in government and legal rules,163
this overstates the latitude that man has to act in society. If happi-
ness were doing whatever one pleases, the pursuit of happiness
would conflict with others' rights.' 64
Specifically, an individual's pursuit of personal contentment
might compete with others' rights to pursue happiness, life, and lib-
erty (and property as subsumed thereunder). For example, an indi-
vidual's happiness under the psychological conception may include
the fulfillment of wants such as the desire for tyrannical power,
which would infringe on others' rights. Competing rights such as
these mean that happiness could never be secured for all. As a re-
sult, it would be impossible for any government to ensure happiness
for all where happiness is personal satisfaction. 165
If Jefferson had held the psychological conception of happi-
ness, he could not have thought it possible for a government to aid
its pursuit by individuals whose wants bring them into conflict with
the rights of others. By contrast, under the ethical conception, the
desires to be fulfilled include only those desired by a morally virtu-
ous person 66 and would not involve a conflict of rights. According
to Adler, "[t]his confirms the reasoning that led us to the conclusion
that Jefferson held the ethical rather than the psychological concep-
tion of happiness when he asserted our natural right to pursue it
and our natural right to obtain whatever real goods we need in or-
der to make good lives for ourselves."'1 67
Adler also contends that Jefferson held an ethical conception
of happiness as evidenced by his omission of the term "obtain"
from the Declaration. Unlike the Declaration of Independence,
Mason's Virginia Declaration refers to inherent rights including the
right to "pursuing and obtaining happiness."' 168 As Adler explains:
A just government can aid and abet our pursuit of hap-
piness - our effort to make morally good lives for our-
selves - but it cannot help us to obtain happiness,
163 Id.
164 If Hamowy's reference to heavenly salvation imputes a religious dimen-
sion, and therefore a moral component to men's actions in pursuing happiness,
then the ethical conception might more accurately represent Hamowy's
interpretation.
165 ADLER, supra note 145, at 56.
166 See id. at 52-54.
167 Id. at 56.
168 Virginia Declaration of Rights, in GERBER, supra note 63, at 58-60.
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since that depends in part on our possession of moral
virtue. Hence Jefferson's retention of 'pursuit' and his
elimination of 'obtain' indicate his espousal of the ethi-
cal, not the psychological, conception of happiness. 169
This link betWeen virtue and happiness was widely accepted in
the eighteenth century. 170 "It was not only 18th century Englishmen
and Americans who equated happiness with 'a knowledge of moral
duties,' but the entire Western tradition beginning with the ancient
Greek and Roman moralists" - sources found in Jefferson's com-
monplace books.171 To Jefferson, "true happiness depends on virtue
and virtue means, above all, the social virtues that bind us to one
another. T172 Although differing talents and circumstances mean
that there are various paths to happiness, the "universal compo-
nent" of happiness remains virtue, doing good to others. 173
"[M]orality was an essential ingredient in Jefferson's idea of
happiness.' 74 Jefferson connected happiness with virtue in many of
his other writings, 75 as did his contemporaries. For example, John
Adams linked virtue with "human happiness" in his Thoughts on
Government.176 In Notes on the State of Virginia, Jefferson referred
to the pursuit of happiness and to freedom in all just pursuits. "Jef-
ferson was emphasizing that freedom was license to do not anything
at all in order to attain one's 'greatest happiness' but only what was
consistent with the moral sense of justice."' 77 Thus, "Jefferson also
maintained that morality was conducive to the general happiness in
that if most persons were moral in their behavior toward others,
few would suffer the miseries of having their natural rights trans-
gressed, and most would thereby be able to enjoy happiness derived
169 ADLER, supra note 145, at 54.
170 YARBROUGH, supra note 103, at 15-16.'
171 Id.
172 Id. at 23.
173 Id. at 26.
174 JAYNE, supra note 29, at 136.
175 Id. (citing Opinion on Treaty, 28 April 1793 ["All the tranquility, the hap-
piness and security of mankind rest on justice or the obligation to respect the rights
of others"]; letter to Amos J. Cook, 21 Jan. 1816 ["And if the Wise be the happy
man, as these sages say, he must be virtuous too; for, without virtue, happiness
cannot be").
176 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 87 (Robert J. Taylor ed., 1979).
177 JAYNE, supra note 29, at 135.
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from exercising those rights unimpeded by the moral transgressions
of others. '
178
This necessary element of moral virtue in happiness is beyond
the control of the government. Moral virtue is exclusively within an
individual's power, no matter how just a government might be.
"But although we need it as an indispensable condition for success
in leading a morally good life, it is an interior perfection that is
almost wholly within our power to attain in some measure or de-
gree. ' 179 If Jefferson had subscribed to the psychological view, as-
serts Adler, he would have had no reason to drop obtain; it makes
perfect sense for a person to have a right to those things which
bring him to a state of contentment. "But when happiness is con-
ceived ethically as a whole life well-lived, then it cannot be enjoyed
or attained at any moment during the course of one's life." 180
For Jefferson, "to 'pursue one's happiness' includes acquiring
and possessing property and living in accordance with God's moral
law. Jefferson wanted a phrase that embodied more than the word
property, so he chose the phrase 'pursuit of Happiness' which em-
bodies the former along with a richer meaning.' 181 This richer
meaning, encompassing virtue, has implications for the governmen-
tal duties related to the pursuit of happiness. The ethical view of
happiness implies a governmental duty to facilitate, rather than pro-
vide, happiness. The Declaration's right to pursue happiness, there-
fore, provides a strong moral argument for requiring the
government to ensure the basic necessities for the pursuit of
happiness.
IV. GOVERNMENTAL DUTIES
The possible governmental duties lie on a spectrum from "the
duty to protect" the pursuit of happiness to "the duty to provide"
happiness. The government may have a duty to protect the pursuit
of happiness in that it must prevent others from interfering with an
individual's pursuit of happiness. On the other hand, the govern-
ment may have an affirmative duty to ensure that all individuals
178 Id.
179 ADLER, supra note 145, at 57.
180 Id. at 54.
181 Timothy R. Tompkins, Pirate Ships, Pontiacs, and Prostitutes: The Innocent
Owner's Alienable Right of Property under Bennis v. Michigan, 9 REGENT U. L.
REV. 285, 310 (1997).
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attain the goal of happiness. Even if the government is not charged
with the duty to provide happiness for all, it may be required to
assist the people so that all have a meaningful opportunity to pur-
sue happiness. Specifically, the government must ensure the mini-
mum needs essential to pursue happiness.
A. Possible Governmental Duties
Governmental action would vary widely at either end of the
spectrum. Interpreting the Declaration to entitle each individual to
happiness is vastly different from an interpretation that deems the
duty of government to be merely the protection of individual quests
from undue interference by others. In the first conception, govern-
ments would be obliged to furnish individuals with material condi-
tions and goods, including tangible property such as land in such
varieties and such amounts as necessary to make them happy. At
the other extreme, the government would be responsible for setting
up a system of laws which would protect individuals in their pursuit
of happiness. Presumably, this responsibility would not entail more
than the exercise of ordinary police powers and the protection of
civil rights connected to the pursuit of happiness. However, accord-
ing to the intermediate conception of governmental duties, the gov-
ernment would be responsible for both protection of the pursuit of
happiness and the provision of basic necessities. The intermediate
conception requires governments to facilitate the pursuit of happi-
ness. Merely stopping interference in the pursuit of happiness is in-
sufficient. In order for there to be equality in the pursuit of
happiness 182 - for the pursuit to be meaningful - the government
must ensure the basic necessities of life.
1. Duty to Provide
According to Arthur Schlesinger, the pursuit of happiness en-
tails a legal right to attain happiness based on the language and the
political theory of the time. "[I]f the common supposition [that
there is only a right to try to obtain happiness] is mistaken, it fol-
lows that the historic manifesto proclaimed the practicing rather
than the quest of happiness as a basic right equally with life and
182 "[Tlhese political rights proved inadequate to assure us equality in the
pursuit of happiness .... 90 CONG. REC. 57 (1944); see also supra text accompany-
ing note 28 (FDR's economic bill of rights).
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liberty." 183 First, Schlesinger relies on the following definition of
pursuit. Since the sixteenth-century, pursuit is said to have had two
meanings: the conventional interpretation of seeking ("pursuing,
chasing") and the "action of engaging in something, as a profession,
business, recreation, etc .... "184 According to Schlesinger, the latter
meaning was intended in the Declaration, i.e., the pursuit of happi-
ness means the actual practicing of happiness. He claims that the
concept appears in "patriot writings" only in the sense of actual
practicing, citing James Otis, Josiah Quincy, James Wilson and John
Adams. 185
Adams, for example, wrote that, "'the happiness of society is
the end of government.'1.86 Adams apparently found no fault with
Jefferson's version of pursuit of happiness, although it is known that
he did with other passages. 187 In Schlesinger's view, these two facts
combine to yield the conclusion that Jefferson believed in a right to
attain happiness. Schlesinger also asserts "none of these spokesmen
of the American cause thought of happiness as something a people
were entitled to simply strive for but as something that was theirs
by natural right.' 88
Indeed, Mason's Virginia Declaration of Rights proclaimed
that all men have certain inherent rights including "pursuing and
obtaining happiness" 189 but the Declaration does not contain "and
obtaining." According to Schlesinger, "doubtless [Jefferson]
deemed the added words sheer excess baggage." 190 Rather than
holding that the omission of the term means that Jefferson explicitly
rejected the "practicing" interpretation of happiness, Schlesinger
contends the move was purely rhetorical. He supports this conclu-
sion by looking to the other use of happiness in the Declaration. In
his view, "to effect their safety and happiness" clearly indicates the
practicing of happiness, not a mere quest. Under Schlesinger's in-
terpretation, the government would have a duty to provide happi-
ness to everyone, so that they could practice it as is their right.
183 Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Lost Meaning of 'The Pursuit of Happiness,'
21 WM. & MARY Q. 325, 325 (1964).
184 Id.
185 Id. at 326.
186 Id. (quoting John Adams, Thoughts on Government (1976)).
187 Id. at 327.
188 Id. at 326.
189 Virginia Declaration of Rights, in GERBER, supra note 63, at 90-91.
190 Schlesinger, supra note 183, at 326-27.
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Although the inclusion of the phrase "effect their safety and
happiness" seems to support Schlesinger's reading of the pursuit of
happiness, it must be understood in context. In the Declaration, the
phrase follows the assertion of a right to revolution and refers to
the type of government that the people should then attempt to es-
tablish. 191 The Declaration states that the people should choose the
government "most likely" to effect happiness; it does not follow
that the government must effect happiness for each individual. 192
While it is possible that Jefferson omitted "and obtaining" because
it was redundant, it does not necessarily follow that Jefferson be-
lieved in a right to obtain happiness. As Schlesinger states, "Why he
determined upon his own more concise rendering we do not know.
•.. It is therefore an overstatement to conclude that Jefferson
"doubtless" thought the words to be needlessly repetitive. 94 More-
over, Schlesinger's interpretation requires that happiness be a static
entity, something the government could give and people could ob-
tain. As discussed above, Jefferson's happiness is an individualistic
and ever-changing notion; it depends on the person and his or her
circumstances. Therefore, it is not likely that Jefferson would em-
brace Schlesinger's definition of "practicing happiness." In addi-
tion, virtue is not an object that the government could provide.
While material goods and conditions may assist in the pursuit of
happiness, virtue must come from inside.
Nevertheless, one can reject Schlesinger's practicing happiness
theory without rejecting the possibility of any governmental duty
regarding happiness. The right to practice happiness would require
that the government provide happiness; if one lacks happiness, one
cannot practice it. The right to seek happiness, on the other hand,
may imply a governmental duty to protect one's pursuit of happi-
191 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776), reprinted in
JAYNE, supra note 29.
192 See MAIER, supra note 5.
193 Schlesinger, supra note 183, at 317.
194 Other scholars have criticized Schlesinger's reasoning. Jayne, for instance,
argues that "obtaining" was inconsistent with Locke's (and Jefferson's) belief that
happiness is dependant on changing circumstances and therefore there is no right
to obtain it; the use of the phrase "most likely" is tentative and thus consistent with
the "elusive nature" of happiness put forth by Locke and Jefferson via the word
"pursuit." JAYNE, supra note 29, at 132. But cf. Yarbrough, supra note 103, at 202
n.66 ("practice" fits well with Jefferson's political theory because it is the practice
of- and not merely the search after - objects such as conscience, health, occupa-
tion that produces happiness).
2003] ECONOMIC RIGHTS 589
ness. That is, the omission of "and obtaining" from the Declaration
may indicate that the government has only a minimum duty to pro-
tect. "What its absence indicates is that the emphasis is on opportu-
nity, not result, an emphasis that was also seen in the Declaration's
definition of equality." 195 In other words, as all men are created
equal, all men are given the right to try to achieve happiness; no
assurance of remaining equal or obtaining happiness is given.
2. Duty to Protect
The right to the pursuit of happiness may yield only a govern-
mental duty to protect the quest for happiness from the interfer-
ence of others. According to White, "in the final version of the
Declaration the purpose of government must be understood merely
as that of making secure rights which have been given by God, which
means making them secure against invasion."' 196 In an earlier draft
of the Declaration, the purpose of government was stated as "to
secure these ends." In the final version, "ends" was changed to
"rights."' 197 If life, liberty and pursuit of happiness were ends, a
more powerful argument might be made for equating the pursuit of
happiness with the practicing of happiness. The use of the term
rights, however, indicates a duty to guard rather than attain. White
concludes that "rights" implies a dilution of the purpose of govern-
ment from "abettor of men in active attainment" to a
"protector."198
Because there is no contemporary record of the Congress, it is
not clear who suggested this change. It is possible that the initial
draft intentionally referred to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness
as ends because the drafter(s) did believe in a governmental duty of
providing happiness for all and that the wording was changed at the
insistence of others. This is pure speculation, however. Even pursuit
195 GERBER, supra note 63, at 55.
196 WHITE, supra note 69, at 250.
197 "That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, de-
riving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any
Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the
People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its Foun-
dation on such Principles and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to Them shall
seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness." THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776), reprinted in JAYNE, supra note 29, at 175 app.;
see also WHITE, supra note 69, at 249-50.
198 WHITE, supra note 69, at 251-52.
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of happiness as an eventual end of government does not automati-
cally lead to a governmental obligation to immediately provide hap-
piness. Moreover, although the phrase "to secure these rights" was
changed, the term "these ends" appears in the same sentence. Thus,
ends and rights were used interchangeably here. Regardless, the
government does have a duty to secure the pursuit of happiness
against invasion by others. It is not clear, however, that the govern-
ment's duty ends here, as White contends.
Some scholars have argued that Jefferson would never have
subscribed to a big government, welfare state obliged to help pro-
vide happiness. Under this interpretation of Jefferson's political
philosophy, Jefferson believed government is only obliged to pro-
tect the pursuit of happiness. Government ought to restrain aggres-
sion, compel contributions helpful to society as a whole, and require
individuals to submit to an impartial arbiter when conflicts arise.199
"Although the right to pursue happiness entails moral obligations
to others... it does not fundamentally alter the limited role" of gov-
ernment.200 By contrast, some argue that the right to pursue happi-
ness "is the right to be in a situation where that pursuit has some
reasonable and continually refreshed chance of moving toward its
goal. The duty of government to secure this right is a duty to act
affirmatively." 20 1
3. Duty to Facilitate
The government's role with regard to natural rights is uncer-
tain, particularly with regard to the right to pursue happiness.202
Nevertheless, the middle ground between the two extremes of the
practice of happiness and the protected quest for happiness seems
to be the most satisfactory understanding of the phrase. In the in-
termediate conception, the government is not obliged to attain hap-
piness for individuals, but it must do more than simply police
interference with an individual's quest. In order to ensure that the
199 YARBROUGH, supra note 103, at 22.
200 Id. at 22-23.
201 CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS,
NAMED AND UNNAMED 131-132 (1997). The same argument made against Schles-
inger's use of "secure" can be made here, i.e., the Declaration refers to a form of
government "most likely" to secure, it does not impose an absolute duty. Black's
basis for an affirmative duty, however, is broader than mere reliance on the use of
the term "secure," as will be discussed below. Id.
202 C.f WHITE, supra note 69, at 256.
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right to pursue happiness is meaningful and enjoyed by all, the gov-
ernment must provide minimum needs. "Both the plain and ordi-
nary meaning of happiness and its common usage in the eighteenth
century indicate that the notion of happiness cannot be entirely sep-
arated from material well-being. Access to the minimal necessities
of life, such as shelter or basic medical care, is thus an indispensable
prerequisite to the notion of happiness. '20 3
The intermediate view is most consistent with the interpreta-
tion of happiness as a right founded on virtue. Under the ethical
view, a government would be unable to provide happiness because
it is impossible to bestow moral virtue on another person. Thus, to
speak of a right to obtain happiness that implies an affirmative duty
to provide on the part of the government is nonsensical. 204 Happi-
ness is not a static state to be achieved, but a way of life.20 5 In the
ethical conception, happiness involves being morally just, a quality
no government can provide. A just government whose goals include
the pursuit of happiness, however, must facilitate happiness. 206
With regard to individuals, the government does not (and under the
ethical conception, cannot) provide happiness. But according to the
ethical view, it must establish the conditions under which its citizens
have a meaningful chance to be happy. 20 7 In particular, there are
minimum needs that must be met in order to pursue happiness, for
instance, food, shelter and clothing.208 Thus the government must
provide the conditions to enable individuals to pursue happiness,
even though it is not obligated to bestow happiness.
203 Lockwood, supra note 7, at 15 (footnotes omitted).
204 ADLER, supra note 145, at 54.
205 Herbert Lawrence Ganter also believes that happiness cannot be obtained
but involves the internal cultivation of the mind. According to Ganter, the phrase
"pursuit of happiness" has been interpreted "too myopically, and with too unbal-
anced an emphasis, for most of the stress seems to have been laid on the kinetic
aspect of the metaphorical use of 'pursuit' as a mere physical motion, rather that
on the more Jeffersonian approximation, that true contentment arises from intellec-
tual and spiritual excursions." Herbert Lawrence Ganter, Jefferson's 'Pursuit of
Happiness' and Some Forgotten Men (First Installment), 16 WM. & MARY Q. 442,
442 (1936) (emphasis added).
206 ADLER, supra note 145, at 57-58.
207 Id. at 54-55.
208 See Lockwood, supra note 7, at 8 ("pursuing and obtaining happiness"
encompasses a right to basic subsistence, i.e., "a guarantee of state protection
against the deprivation of the food, clothing, shelter, and medical care minimally
necessary for a decent life").
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"The 'pursuit of happiness' must mean something. What it
means is that all individuals who are unable to fend for themselves
must be furnished with the material conditions indispensable to the
pursuit of happiness, facilitating but not ensuring its attainment.
'209
The right to pursue happiness, then, implies that "human beings
have a natural right to work for happiness with a reasonable chance
of getting it.''210 The pursuit of happiness depends to some extent
on circumstances beyond an individual's control. For instance, with-
out health and a minimum standard of living, it is not only impossi-
ble for a man to attain happiness, it is impossible that he can
effectively strive for happiness.21 A malnourished child or a society
afflicted with high infant mortality is not enjoying a right to pursuit
of happiness.2
12
Thus, the right to pursue happiness does not require the gov-
ernment to provide happiness, "[b]ut the assistance of others - in-
cluding the government - is nevertheless sometimes required,
because without the minimum necessities of life an individual is
forced to struggle for daily survival and, therefore, has no opportu-
nity to pursue his or her happiness. '213 "What organized societies
and instituted governments can do is provide human beings with
the external conditions indispensable to the pursuit of happiness,
facilitating but not ensuring its attainment. The right to pursue hap-
piness is, therefore, a right to these indispensable external condi-
tions. . 214 These indispensable external conditions may
encompass a broad range of rights. In short, they include "a right to
a decent livelihood," and the "comforts and conveniences of life
that are accessory to a successful pursuit of happiness." 215 They in-
209 GERBER, supra note 63, at 193. See also ADLER, supra note 145, at 58
(government and society can provide external conditions for the pursuit of happi-
ness, facilitating but not ensuring its attainment).
210 George Anastoplo, The Constitution at Two Hundred: Explorations, 22
TEx. TECH. L. REV. 967, 989 (1992).
211 GERBER, supra note 63, at 194.
212 BLACK, supra note 201, at 137.
213 GERBER, supra note 63, at 193.
214 MORTIMER J. ADLER & WILLIAM GORMAN, THE AMERICAN TESTAMENT
40 (1975).
215 ADLER, supra note 145, at 149. Adler provides an extensive list of eco-
nomic necessities: a decent supply of means of subsistence; living and working con-
ditions conducive to health; medical care; and time and access to opportunities for
leisure and continuous education. Id. According to Adler, however, such rights
were not recognized at the time of the Declaration or the Constitution; indeed,
they were not recognized until the twentieth century. Id. at 122, 132-33. 1 argue, by
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clude the right "to basic education, health care, food, housing, and
clothing, for without these things an individual is denied an oppor-
tunity to pursue a good and happy life."
'216
The pursuit of happiness does not, however, require equality in
material goods. "Although the political philosophy of the American
Founding does not envision an egalitarian welfare state - indeed,
the Declaration's concepts of 'equality' and 'liberty' forbid it -
that philosophy does require some public assistance programs so
that every individual has an opportunity to pursue his or her happi-
ness. '217 The pursuit of happiness as used in the Declaration en-
compasses these minimum rights because the right to pursue
happiness - an end and fundamental purpose of government -
would be meaningless without basic economic rights.
Moreover, the moral dimension of pursuit of happiness indi-
cates that virtue and happiness are intertwined. If a person lacks
basic needs like food and shelter, she likely cannot pursue happi-
ness. At the least, failure to provide conditions for pursuit of happi-
ness would discourage individuals from adopting a virtuous pursuit
of happiness, and likely encourage immoral and fleeting grabs at
that which provides short-term satisfaction. The internal cultivation
of the mind toward virtue, based on intellectual and spiritual pur-
suits, is often beyond the reach of those preoccupied with the
scramble to scrape together sufficient food and shelter. The gen-
tleman farmer - or today's multimillionaire - has ample time to
read the classics to understand virtue and the public good, along
with the luxury of acting accordingly without threatening his lifes-
tyle. Such a notion is absurd to one who is simply trying to survive.
Without fortunate circumstances or the help of the government, the
virtuous pursuit of happiness is difficult if not impossible to achieve.
While many of the poor may be virtuous, they cannot be said to
have a meaningful opportunity to pursue happiness if they are pre-
occupied with trying to stay alive.
contrast, that such rights were recognized by eighteenth-century political philoso-
phers such as Jefferson but that the implementation of such rights looked very
different than today because of the economic and social circumstances of early
America.
216 GERBER, supra note 63, at 194. These rights rise to level of constitutional
rights when the Constitution is interpreted "in accordance with the natural- rights
political philosophy of the Declaration of Independence." Id.
217 Id. at 194.
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Furthermore, a proper understanding of happiness includes a
right to property, as discussed above. Property such as land facili-
tates the pursuit of happiness by providing food and shelter.218 Jef-
ferson believed that property should be regulated without violating
"the natural right to the means of subsistence. '" 219 "To improve
one's material conditions as a result of one's own individual efforts
was a further extension of the natural right to property. '220 Land
seemed in limitless supply when the Declaration was drafted. 2
21
Any industrious 222 (free white) man had access to land sufficient to
provide minimal subsistence. "Land was abundant and available to
anyone to settle, hunt and farm. Poor persons who could not make
a living in settled communities had the option of moving to the
frontier as long as they were capable of physical labor."223 Moreo-
ver, in an agricultural society "with a vast, unsettled western fron-
tier, paid work presumably was available to everyone who wanted
it."224
In order to avoid concentrations of land and other property
that would alter these unlimited opportunities, Jefferson supported
218 Property was a component of happiness, along with liberty and education.
Happiness included "milk for the children, and meat on the table, a well-built
house and a well-filled barn, freedom from the tyranny of the state, the supersti-
tion of the church, the authority of the military, and the malaise of ignorance."
COMMAGER, supra note 42, at 89. As discussed below, the need for public educa-
tion to create good citizens is similar to the need for government intervention
where basic subsistence is inaccessible.
219 KOCH, supra note 150, at 79.
220 Id.
221 Jefferson described America as providing property to anyone: "The politi-
cal institutions of America, its various soils and climates, open a certain resource to
the unfortunate and to the enterprising of every country and insured to them the
acquisition and free possession of property." Thomas Jefferson, Declaration on
Taking Up Arms, 1775, Papers 1:199, available at http://etext.virginia.edu/jefferson/
quotations/jeffl550.htm (Thomas Jefferson on Politics & Government: Property
Rights).
222 Despite his "generally sunny view of human nature" Jefferson recognized
that some men would not take advantage of the opportunities available in
America; some were poor because they lacked "character and will." YARBROUGH,
supra note 103, at 69 (discussing bill for support of poor including provisions for
workhouses and compulsory labor). Nonetheless, he apparently expected the vast
majority of men to embrace agrarian virtue in the near future, while recognizing
the need to adapt to manufacturing and urban life. Id. at 70-77.
223 See Lockwood, supra note 7, at 16.
224 Moore v. Ganim, 233 Conn. 557, 636 (Peters, C.J., concurring) ("A right
to governmental support is even more important today than it was 350 years ago,
when our forebears recognized the right").
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economic reforms. For example, he advocated the abolition of pri-
mogeniture and entail to redistribute property.225 As Jefferson de-
scribed it, "America has 'no paupers; the old and crippled among
us, who possess nothing and have no families to take care of them,
being too few to notice . . ."' - in other words, a property-owning
middle class republic. 226 Unlike in the Old World, there was no
grinding poverty or vast disparities based on rigid social or eco-
nomic inequalities. Rather, any disparities among the people in
America resulted from differences in effort and talent; even the rich
in America are "of moderate wealth. '227
Jefferson compared the situation in France with that in
America, commenting on the concentration of land among the few
in France and the vast numbers of poor who cannot find work.228
Whenever there are in any country uncultivated lands
and unemployed poor, it is clear that the laws of prop-
erty have been so far extended as to violate natural
right. The earth is given as a common stock for man to
labor and live on. If for the encouragement of industry
we allow it to be appropriated, we must take care that
other employment be provided to those excluded from
the appropriation. If we do not, the fundamental right
to labour the earth returns to the unemployed. It is too
soon yet in our country to say that every man who can-
not find employment, but who can find uncultivated
land, shall be at liberty to cultivate it, paying a modest
rent. But it is not too soon to provide by every possible
means that as few as possible shall be without a little
portion of land. The small landholders are the most
precious part of a state.
22 9
The distribution of wealth in America today is far different from
the moderation Jefferson perceived. In 1997, one percent of Ameri-
cans owned 40% of the country's wealth. Disparities are increasing,
and education is no longer a mitigating factor; for instance, one-
225 SHELDON, supra note 109, at 74.
226 YARBROUGH, supra note 103, at 98 (quoting Jefferson's letter to Thomas
Cooper, Sept. 10, 1814).
227 Id.
228 SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 388-89 (Letter from Thomas Jeffer-
son to Reverend James Madison (Oct. 28, 1785)).
229 Id. at 390.
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third of the poor in New York have some college or a college
degree.2
30
Jefferson believed that farmers - landowners - were the best
citizens because they would have the ability to cultivate wisdom and
virtue. The landowner's economic independence would inculcate
public virtue and qualify him for political participation.231 This ex-
plains why suffrage was limited to landowners: only those with
property had the time and education to properly exercise political
rights. 232 Jefferson wished to create public education to cultivate
worthy citizens so that "the people could select able governors and
representatives of a just and happy state. '233 Men who labored long
hours in terrible conditions were not qualified to participate in gov-
ernment; similarly, Americans could not pursue happiness unless
they had access to the means of sustenance. Land initially provided
that means of sustenance, but when agrarian society proved inade-
quate for economic independence, the government would have to
step in to ensure access to the pursuit of happiness.
Jefferson recognized that manufacturing and cities were inevi-
table. He eventually adapted his agrarian ideal in order to secure
economic independence for the country. Land was no longer the
only means toward virtue, but rather land or a "satisfactory situa-
tion" in terms of wages and labor for those working in services or
manufacturing.234 The changed circumstances meant that man was
less likely to be able to ensure the basic necessities through hard
work, leading to a need for governmental help in order to pursue
happiness. At one time, hard work on fertile land would provide
food, and the ample wilderness would provide the means for shel-
ter. But when a society of many farmers adapted to an urban, man-
ufacturing-focused economy, there would be no such open access to
food and shelter. The situation of laborers was more precarious,
based on availability of jobs. Long hours and low pay in terrible
conditions often failed to provide the basic necessities of life even
when employment could be found. "If, in the future and through no
fault of their own, large numbers of Americans fail to find employ-
230 The News Hour with Jim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast, July 17, 2002),
available at www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/economy/july-dec02/democracy-7-17.htm
(last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
231 SHELDON, supra note 109, at 76.
232 ADLER, supra note 145, at 152.
233 SHELDON, supra note 109, at 62, 65.
234 YARBROUGH, supra note 103, at 77.
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ment, the government will be obliged to act in order to secure the
'fundamental right' of individuals to labor for a living.
'235
"The possession of a decent material basis for life is an indis-
pensable condition, for almost all people at all times, to the pursuit
of happiness. The lack of this basis - the lack we call 'poverty' -
is overwhelmingly, in the whole human world, the commonest, the
grimmest, the stubbornest obstacle we know to the pursuit of hap-
piness. ' 236 In Jefferson's time, there was usually a way out of pov-
erty for Americans - plentiful land and hard work. In such
circumstances, government aid was less necessary, yet Jefferson rec-
ognized that in a new economy, new government help might be re-
quired.237 But the government has not kept pace with the changing
economy. Regardless of hard work, a "satisfactory situation" in
terms of a living wage is often unavailable today.
238
Based on Jefferson's conception of happiness as a virtuous en-
deavor requiring basic necessities, the pursuit of happiness entails
that the government facilitate happiness. It cannot provide happi-
ness, for it is impossible for the government to give virtue; but it
must do more than merely protect the quest from interference
where external barriers impede the pursuit. A just government
must secure the right to the pursuit of happiness by ensuring the
conditions necessary to a viable quest for a morally good life. A
proper reading of the Declaration reveals that basic economic
rights are rooted in the foundation of American democracy. In or-
der to fulfill the unalienable rights enshrined in the Declaration of
Independence, the United States should at least attempt to provide
the conditions necessary to pursue happiness. 239 But the govern-
ment of the United States today refuses to acknowledge, let alone
235 Id. at 100.
236 BLACK, supra note 201, at 133.
237 This is not to say that colonial governments did not provide assistance.
"As Professor Ely points out, colonial governments in fact assumed significant re-
sponsibility for assuring an adequate standard of living." Barbara Stark, Decon-
structing the Framers' Right to Property: Liberty's Daughters and Economic Rights,
28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 963, 1039 (2000).
238 For statistics on the minimum wage and the unaffordability of housing, for
example, see infra Part 111C.
239 Scholars have argued for a range of welfare rights based on the Constitu-
tion. For a list of numerous articles on the topic, see Helen Hershkoff, Positive
Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112
HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1133 n.9 (1999).
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meet, its obligation to provide all Americans a fair opportunity for
happiness.
B. Enforceability of Duties
The conception of the pursuit of happiness as a right implies
certain governmental duties, yet the Declaration has not been inter-
preted by the courts to provide legally enforceable rights. Several
legal scholars, most notably Charles Black, have argued that the
Supreme Court should correct this error.240 The likelihood of the
Court embracing the unalienable rights of the Declaration as legally
enforceable rights, however, is slim.2 4' Nevertheless, the concept of
a governmental obligation derived from the Declaration can be a
powerful political and moral assertion. Jefferson himself described
the Declaration as "the genuine effusion of the soul of our country
at that time. '242 The true meaning of the pursuit of happiness might
have an effect in the political arena, even if unsuccessful as a litiga-
tion strategy. Particularly in the context of international human
rights, government obligations derived from our founding docu-
ment may be an effective rhetorical strategy to refute the notion
that economic rights are un-American. In the absence of enforce-
ment mechanisms, moral suasion and mobilizing shame play a cen-
tral role in international human rights.
There are several reasons why the Declaration should be taken
seriously in the courts as well as in the public arena. First, the Dec-
laration was a "distinctly juristic act - the foundation of all later
juristic acts in our territory. '243 Courts should take the Declaration
as seriously as its signers did - men who risked real danger to their
lives, fortune and honor by publicly acceding to a treasonous docu-
ment.244 Second, the early congresses took the Declaration seri-
ously. In acts admitting ten states to the union, Congress required
240 See, e.g., BLACK, supra note 201.
241 Given the long history of the Slaughterhouse Cases, wholesale reversal
seems unlikely. Nevertheless, one commentator has asserted that the Supreme
Court "may be ready" to repudiate the Slaughterhouse Cases, at least in the con-
text of state regulations restricting free enterprise. Clint Bolick, Free to Work: Eco-
nomic Liberty May Finally Win Judicial Respect, LEGAL TIMES, April 29, 2002, at
50. See also discussion regarding the Slaughterhouse Cases infra pp 47-48.
242 SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 722 (Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to Dr. James Mease (Sept. 26, 1825)).
243 Id. at 6.
244 Id. at 7.
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that the state constitutions further the principles of the Declara-
tion.245 Finally, "[t]he Declaration is the root of all political author-
ity among us, of all legitimate exercise of power.
'246
The Constitution, in other words, is a political docu-
ment in the noblest sense. It establishes a framework
of government through which certain underlying philo-
sophical principles are to be advanced. And those phil-
osophical principles are the natural-rights principles of
the Declaration of Independence. To ignore this fact is
to ignore the reason we are a nation.2 47
The Constitution must embody the principles of the Declaration in
order to be a legitimate exercise of power and to meet the standard
implicit in the Declaration for a proper government. Unless the
government established by the Constitution secures man's unalien-
able rights, including the pursuit of happiness, the people may alter
and abolish it for a government more likely to effect their safety
and happiness. 248 Thus, "the doctrines of the Declaration should be
taken to have the force of law - the force in law of general com-
mitments from which particular law can be derived. '249 Even if the
Declaration is not given the force of law, the same reasons dictate
that the Declaration should be taken as a "basis for law, as a nour-
isher of law, whether or not it be taken to be law of its own unaided
force. 250 Thus, the right to pursue happiness and particularly eco-
245 JONES, supra note 30, at 27. For example, the state of Nebraska was admit-
ted provided that its "constitution, when formed, shall be republican, and not re-
pugnant to the Constitution of the United States and the principles of the
Declaration of Independence." Id.
246 BLACK, supra note 201, at 9.
247 GERBER, supra note 63, at 15.
248 MAIER, supra note 5, at 192. It should be noted that the Constitution or
Bill of Rights does not contain language from the Declaration despite attempts
such as Madison's proposed First Amendment providing for the governmental pur-
pose of "generally pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." See JONES, supra
note 30, at 20-22. Nevertheless, John Marshall stated, "That the people have an
original right to establish, for their future government, such principles as, in their
opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis on which the whole
American fabric has been created." PAUL EIDELBERG, ON THE SILENCE OF THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 52 (1976).
249 BLACK, supra note 201, at 8.
250 Id.; see also MAIER, supra note 5, at 154 (Declaration became "a moral
standard by which the day-to-day policies and practices of the nation could be
judged").
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nomic rights should be recognized by the courts as well as the exec-
utive and legislative branches. The government's legitimacy should
be based on furthering the principles of the Declaration, as the eli-
gibility. of entering states initially hinged on honoring the
Declaration.
Charles Black argues that the government has an affirmative
constitutional duty to "ensure, humanly speaking, a decent liveli-
hood by all" through "good faith action, over a wide and not dis-
tinctly bounded range."' 251 He contends that such an affirmative
duty is not unusual. The Constitution requires many duties of the
three branches, and implies a duty to commit the necessary re-
sources to carry out those duties - from administering the Census
and providing trial by jury to seeing that the laws are faithfully exe-
cuted.252 Thus, there is no Constitutional barrier to positive eco-
nomic rights. Rather, "[t]he problem is much more a matter of
political will than deontic logic, and the present situation much
more a product of constitutional blindness than interpretavist fidel-
ity."'253 For instance, the requirements of providing attorneys and
confinement conditions that are not cruel and unusual punishment
dictate action by all three branches (and two levels) of government
- including the expenditure of vast sums of money. The labeling of
economic rights as illegitimate positive rights, as contrasted with
negative rights of the Constitution, creates a false dichotomy. 254
Therefore the Declaration can and should be used to inform the
interpretation of the Constitution.
Specifically, Black argues that the unenumerated rights of the
Ninth Amendment 255 include the Declaration's inalienable
rights. 256 In addition, the privileges and immunities of citizens of
251 BLACK, supra note 201, at 133, 135.
252 Id. at 134-35; see also Lockwood, supra note 7, at 9-12 (affirmative nature
of right to safety and happiness as well as of civil and political rights).
253 Jeremy Waldron, Book Note, Charles L. Black, Jr.'s A New Birth of Free-
dom, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 765, 782 (1998).
254 The distinction between positive and negative rights is key to the refusal
to consider welfare as a Constitutional right. The Constitution is said to provide
only for negative rights, i.e. the right to restrain the State from infringing upon
liberties, not positive rights entailing affirmative duties. See, e.g., Hershkoff, supra
note 239, at 1133-39; see also sources cited supra note 9.
255 "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be con-
strued to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend.
IX.
256 BLACK, supra note 201, at 22.
600 [Vol. XIX
2003] ECONOMIC RIGHTS 601
the United States ensured by the Fourteenth Amendment 257 are the
very rights named in the Declaration.258 Black's theory has been
criticized as fatally flawed due to its reliance on the Declaration -
reliance that flies in the face of over two hundred years of case law
refusing to recognize the Declaration as having any governing
force.259 Black, of course, is aware of this case law, and provides a
compelling critique, particularly of the Slaughterhouse Cases.
260
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not adopted Black's the-
ory,261 nor used the pursuit of happiness as a basis for elucidating
significant "fundamental rights.
'262
Pursuit of happiness has been referred to in fundamental rights
cases, but it has not been the legal basis for those decisions. Con-
sider, for example, Meyer v. Nebraska:
263
The case was about parental rights to determine the
education of young children, but in setting the frame-
work for analysis of that issue, the Court remarked
that among the 'liberties' guaranteed by the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was 'the
right of the individual ... to marry, establish a home
and bring up children.' Further, the Court identified
marriage as one of 'those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of hap-
piness by free men.'
264
257 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
258 BLACK, supra note 201, at 52-53.
259 Stacey Hiller, Book Note, A New Birth of Freedom, 7 B. U. PUB. INT. L. J.
369, 375 (1998).
260 BLACK, supra note 201, at 55-85.
261 See MAIER, supra note 5, at 192 (courts have not enforced Declaration).
262 BLACK, supra note 201, at 94-98 (pursuit of happiness rather than substan-
tive due process should embody fundamental rights).
263 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
264 Marc C. Rahdert, Same-Sex Relationships: A Constitutional Commentary,
7 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 495, 487-98 (1998) (footnotes omitted).
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Nevertheless, the reference to happiness was barely relevant to the
holding. Similarly, fundamental rights are generally not seen as con-
nected to economic and social rights, particularly the right to the
basic necessities of life.
2 65
Perhaps the most famous expression of the connection be-
tween the pursuit of happiness and fundamental rights is found in
Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion from Olmstead v. United
States.2 66 Dissenting from the Court's holding that wiretapping is
not a form of search and seizure and therefore not a violation of the
Fourth or Fifth Amendments, Brandeis wrote:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They
recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of
his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a
part of the pain, pleasure, and satisfactions of life are
to be found in material things.
267
Despite Brandeis' eloquent reference to the pursuit of happiness,
neither the state nor federal governments is required to "secure
conditions" facilitating the pursuit of happiness.
Happiness has been connected to the right to pursue employ-
ment, but in a narrow way. For example, the Slaughterhouse Cases
have been interpreted to equate happiness with the right to follow
any job.2 68 Other cases reach contradictory positions, finding either
a "moral right of states to compel citizens to be happy or impel
them away from unhappiness" or denouncing states "for interfering
with private happiness of individuals. '269 The one common element
is that pursuit of happiness is described as freedom to contract or
freedom to labor.2 70 The pursuit of happiness is thus transformed
from an end of a just government so important that government
must assist citizens in their pursuit, to a negative duty of the state to
265 Davis, supra note 9, at 966.
266 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
267 Id. at 478.
268 JONES, supra note 30, at 39.
269 Id. at 49.
270 Id. Later pursuit of happiness cases also reject any affirmative governmen-
tal duty. See id. at 71; see also Grodin, supra note 36, at 20-33 (discussing cases on
state constitutional provisions to happiness and safety, where happiness is seen as
economic liberty or privacy).
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refrain from interfering in an individual's employment
arrangements.
Despite the compelling arguments for enforcing the principles
of the Declaration's right to pursue happiness through the
Constitution:
[t]he United States Supreme Court has made it clear
during the past twenty years that the Federal Constitu-
tion does not impose any affirmative duty upon gov-
ernments to provide indigents with their basic needs,
either directly or through the provision of a job....
There is thus no federal constitutional right to basic
needs even though '[t]he right to basic subsistence is
arguably the most fundamental of all human rights,'
because '[f]or a person who is starving and with-
out shelter, all other rights appear to pale in
comparison.'
271
"'Welfare benefits are not a fundamental right, and neither the
State nor Federal Government is under any sort of constitutional
obligation to guarantee minimum levels of support.' "272 While state
constitutional language about happiness may be said to incorporate
the Declaration's pursuit of happiness clause in much the same way
that the Federal Constitution builds on the pursuit of happiness, no
state government has been required to provide the essentials to
pursue happiness.273 Both the state and federal judiciaries have thus
failed in their duty to live up to the principles of the Declaration.
But even if the courts' views of the state and federal constitutions
271 Lockwood, supra note 7, at 4-5 (footnotes omitted).
272 Id. at 4 (quoting Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 585 n. 9 (1976)) (footnote
omitted).
273 See, e.g., Daugherty v. Wallace, 87 Ohio App. 3d 228 (1993) (affirming
trial court decision that Ohio constitutional right to safety and happiness does not
impose obligation on state to provide minimum welfare benefits); Lockwood,
supra note 7, at 2-3; see also Hershkoff, supra note 239, at 1136 (discussing reluc-
tance of state courts to recognize state duties corresponding to state constitutional
welfare rights). This is not to say that international norms have not been used by
state courts to aid in interpreting state constitutional provisions. See Park, supra
note 9, at 1255-63.
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do not change, the other branches of government might respond to
a call to honor the true meaning of the Declaration.
274
"The 1776 Declaration of Independence commits all the gov-
ernments in our country to 'securing' for its people certain human
rights, 'among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.'
These are the certified cardinal values of our political morality. It is
a separate question whether they are also 'law,' available as
such. '275 The United States currently fails to meet the commitment
of the Declaration, the public statement of the principles the nation
intends to stand for.276 Regardless of judicial enforcement, the force
of the moral argument should be persuasive, particularly in the area
of human rights. A consensus exists within much of the interna-
tional human rights community that the court of public opinion is
as, if not more, important than official courts.277 It should not re-
quire a successful lawsuit to force the nation to live up to its "raison
d'6tre.'1278
The Constitution exists to fulfill the promises made by
the Declaration; it provides a legal and political frame-
work through which those promises can be redeemed
in history. Thus, if we want to understand the meaning
of the Constitution, we must understand the meaning
of those promises. The Constitution creates a structure
of government; but the Declaration explains the reason
that it lives. The Constitution is a body of law; but the
promises contained in the Declaration are its soul.27
9
The refusal to guarantee basic needs leaves the United States out of
step with the intent of our founders and with contemporary values
shared by the international community. For instance, the United
States stands alone among industrialized countries in refusing to
ratify the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
274 Cf Sunstein, supra note 9, at 367, 372 (constitutions should not contain
positive economic rights because they are unenforceable, but governments should
provide "decent opportunities and results to all citizens").
275 BLACK, supra note 201, at 38.
276 Waldron, supra note 253, at 780.
277 See William Twining, Constitutions, Constitutionalism and Constitution-
Mongering, in TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF
THE JUDICIARY 383, 386 (Irwin P. Stotzky, ed. 1993).
278 Waldron, supra note 253, at 780.
279 J. M. Balkin, The Declaration and the Promise of a Democratic Culture, 4
WIDENER L. SYMp. J. 167, 169 (1999).
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Rights (ICESCR).280 The above analysis of the Declaration indi-
cates that the pursuit of happiness - including basic economic
rights - is a core principle of our democracy. The government
therefore must begin to fully adhere to its duty under the Declara-
tion. The United States can start this process by adopting economic
rights such as those embodied in international agreements like the
ICESCR.
C. Duty to Provide Economic Rights Under International Law
International human rights law supports a variety of economic
rights that the United States should embrace and enforce. The
United States has accepted these instruments in principle and
should adhere to the provisions on basic economic needs along with
civil and political protections.281 Although some preliminary steps
have been taken, the government has lacked the political will to
adequately provide the essentials for pursuing happiness.
The United States was a strong proponent, if not the moving
force, behind the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.282 The
Universal Declaration is widely believed to have achieved the sta-
tus of customary international law and is therefore binding on the
United States 28 3 In a recent case, a federal court stated: "While the
[Universal Declaration] is not a treaty, it has an effect similar to a
treaty. It is a declaration published by the General Assembly of the
United Nations 'as a common standard of achievement for all peo-
ples and all nations."284 The preamble of the Universal Declara-
tion echoes President Roosevelt's endorsement of the Four
Freedoms,285 referring to the "advent of a world in which human
m Stark, supra note 15, at 80.
281 For a discussion of international norms with regard to Ohio's constitu-
tional right to pursuing and obtaining happiness, see Lockwood, supra note 7, at
20-24.
282 See GLENDON, supra note 11.
283 See MARTIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW & PRACTICE:
CASES, TREATIES AND MATERIALS 109 (1997) ("[A] Declaration creates an expec-
tation of adherence .... Indeed, several commentators have concluded that the
Universal Declaration has become, in toto, a part of binding, customary interna-
tional law."). But cf Davis, supra note 9, at 977 (Universal Declaration is custom-
ary law, at least as to prohibition against torture, summary execution, genocide.).
284 Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 596 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (using Univer-
sal Declaration and other international documents to interpret Immigration and
Naturalization Act).
285 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to the Congress on the State of the Union
(Jan. 11, 1944), available at http://www.udhr.org/history/1-11-44.htm (last visited
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beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from
fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the
common people." 28 6 The Universal Declaration sets forth numer-
ous protections of human rights including provisions ensuring mini-
mum needs are met.
Article 22 provides: "Everyone, as a member of society, has
the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through
national effort and international co-operation and in accordance
with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic,
social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free
development of his personality. ' 287 Under Article 23, "[e]veryone
has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and
favourable conditions or work and to protection against unemploy-
ment. '288 Everyone is entitled to "just and favourable remunera-
tion ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of
human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of
social protection. '289 Moreover, the Universal Declaration provides
that "[e]veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for
the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including
food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social ser-
vices, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sick-
ness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in
circumstances beyond his control.
'290
Although the United States provides for some of these rights,
the ideal of a "living wage" has been rejected by the United
States.291 While there is a safety net, it is inadequate. Millions of
Americans must rely on private charities for emergency food aid,
Jan. 30, 2003). Roosevelt also called on Congress to provide for rights similar to
those outlined below: right to employment, "right to earn enough to provide ade-
quate food and clothing and recreation," right to "a decent home," right to "ade-
quate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health," and
right to "a good education." Id.
286 Universal Declaration, supra note 10, pmbl., reprinted in HENKIN et al.,
HUMAN RIGHTS: DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT 41 (2001).
287 Id. at 44 (art. 22).
288 Id. (art. 23 (1(2)).
289 Id. (art. 23 3)).
290 Id. art. 25(1)
291 See, e.g., AMERICA NEEDS HUMAN RIGHTS 30 (Anuradha Mittal & Peter
Rosset eds., 1999) (discussing inadequacy of minimum wage and relative decline in
wages for low-income workers); New York City Welfare Reform and Human
Rights Documentation Project, Hunger is No Accident 43-44 (2000) [hereinafter
Welfare Reform] (discussing supplemental food benefits).
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and often must choose between paying for food and paying for
heat, rent or medical care.292 The government's general attitude to-
ward providing greater benefits is hostile, instead exhorting the
poor, homeless or hungry to work harder to achieve the rights to
which they are entitled under both the Universal Declaration and
the Declaration of Independence.
Although the United States has not ratified the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),
under international law it should not take any steps that defeat the
object of the Covenant because it is a signatory to the treaty. 293 The
preamble to the ICESCR recognizes, in accordance with the Uni-
versal Declaration, that "the ideal of free human beings enjoying
freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are
created whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cul-
tural rights, as well as his civil and political rights. '294
The ICESCR provides for the right to work including remuner-
ation that provides workers with "fair wages and equal remunera-
tion for work of equal value" and "a decent living for themselves
and their families in accordance with the provisions of the present
Covenant. ' 295 It also provides for "rest, leisure and reasonable limi-
tation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay. ' 296 Under
Article 11, the "States Parties to the present Covenant recognize
the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself
and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and
to the continuous improvement of living conditions. '297 States,
"recognizing the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hun-
ger, shall take, individually and through international co-operation,
the measures, including specific programmes, which are needed" to
292 AMERICA'S SECOND HARVEST, HUNGER IN AMERICA 2001 NATIONAL
REPORT 1-2 (2001).
293 See Alston, U.S. Ratification, supra note 16. The Bush Administration re-
cently reaffirmed its commitment to this principle in the context of "unsigning" the
Statute of the International Criminal Court. See Mark Grossman, Under Secretary
for Political Affairs, American Foreign Policy and the International Criminal Court
available at http://www.state.gov/p/9949pf.htm (May 6, 2002) (informing United
Nations of intent not to become a party to the statute, "consistent with the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties").
294 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in HEN-
KIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS: DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT 41, 47 (2001) (pmbl).
295 Id. at 49 (art. 7(a)(i), (ii)).
296 Id. (art. 7(d)).
297 Id. at 50 (art. 11(al)).
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improve distribution and production of food.298 Finally, states must
recognize "the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health" and take steps to
achieve the full realization of this right including "the creation of
conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical
attention in the event of sickness. '299
The United States fails to meet these standards. For example,
the United States has rejected the doctrine of equal pay for compa-
rable worth.30 Millions of citizens of the world's wealthiest nation
cannot afford adequate medical care. 301 Similarly, the number of
working poor who cannot afford adequate food or shelter remains
too high. 32 million Americans live at or below the federal poverty
level, and 33 million are either hungry or at risk of hunger.30 2 Of
those households receiving emergency food aid from the nation's
largest hunger relief organization, 39% have at least one adult
working.30 3 Of that 39%, almost half are working full-time (forty
298 Id. (art. 11(2)) (emphasis added).
299 Id. at 51 (art. 12 (1), (1)(d)).
300 For a comparison between "equal pay for comparable worth" and the
more restrictive United States standard of "equal pay for equal work," see Ursula
R. Kubal, Comment: U.S. Multinational Corporations Abroad: A Comparative Per-
spective on Sex Discrimination Law in the United States and the European Union,
25 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 207, 216-37 (1999); see also Proposed U.S. Reser-
vations, Understandings, and Declarations to the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 140 CONG. REC. S13927-04 (1994)
(reservation stating that United States does not accept obligation to enact legisla-
tion establishing the doctrine of comparable worth).
301 The Census Bureau reports that 38.7 million Americans lacked health in-
surance in 2000, 8.5 million of them children. More People Have Health Insurance,
Census Bureau Reports, Economics and Statistics Admin., Bureau of Census (Fall
2001), available at http://www.census.gov/ftp/pub/Press-Release/www/2001/cbO1-
162.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2003). Although this represented a decline from 1999,
it is likely that numbers have increased along with unemployment. See Robin
Toner & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Decade After Health Care Crisis, Soaring Costs
Bring New Strains, N. Y. TiMES, Aug. 11, 2002, at Al (estimated 2 million lost
health insurance in 2001 due to layoffs, on top of 39 million at end of 1990s, and
numbers expected to continue to increase); T. Shawn Taylor, Jobless pay is running
out for 35,000 here, CM. TRIB., June 12, 2002, at C1 (discussing unemployment
increases caused by recession).
302 America's Second Harvest, Who's Hungry: Facts and Figures on Hunger:
Hunger in the Era of Welfare Reform, available at www.secondharvest.org/whos
hungry/whoshungry/hungerwelfare.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
303 America's Second Harvest, Who's Hungry: Facts and Figures on Hunger.
A Profile of the Working Poor Served by America's Second Harvest Food Banks,
2003] ECONOMIC RIGHTS 609
hours or more per week). 304 Affordable housing remains an unreal-
ized dream for millions of American workers. In 2000, 2.7 million
Americans worked for the federal minimum wage of $5.15 (or, in a
few states, a slightly higher amount).30 5 This figure does not include
those with annual salaries at the same level, so 2.7 million under-
states the extent of minimum wage workers. 30 6 But "[t]he average
U.S. worker must earn at least $11.28 an hour to afford the rent on
a modest one-bedroom apartment, or $13.78 an hour for two bed-
rooms. "307 For a single parent to afford even a one-bedroom apart-
ment, she must work more than two full-time, minimum wage jobs
(and find free, safe, reliable childcare along with free food, clothing,
utilities and transportation) in order to attain a basic standard of
living.
With regard to child poverty, the United States has a 22.4%
relative poverty rating, second only to Mexico among the countries
of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Develop-
ment. 30 8 Poor children in the United States are the most likely to
remain poor within 10 years, "which challenges common percep-
tions about mobility and opportunity in the US. ' 309 Thus, children
born into poverty in the United States more often remain poor and
lack a meaningful opportunity to pursue happiness.
Regional treaties also contain provisions relevant to the mini-
mum needs that the United States should ensure. Within the Inter-
available at http://www.secondharvest.org/whoshungry/working__poor.htm (last vis-
ited Jan. 30, 2003).
304 Id.
305 See Jennifer Loven, Report Finds A Growing Gap Between Minimum
Wage and Cost of Rental Housing, Associated Press, Oct. 2, 2002 (figures of "hous-
ing wage" calculated based on the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment's definition of affordable housing at 30% of gross income).
306 Id.
307 Id. See also Jennifer Egan, The Hidden Lives of Homeless Children,
N.Y.TIMES MAO., March 24, 2002 at 32, 34-35 (between 900,000 and 1.3 million
children in America are homeless for a time in a given year). The disparities be-
tween supply and demand for affordable housing have been exacerbated in recent
decades. "In 1970 there were approximately 300,000 more of what are called ex-
tremely-low-income housing units in American than families who needed them;
now there are 4.5 million more extremely-low-income families in need of housing
than there are units in their range of affordability." Id. at 37.
308 UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, Innocenti Report Card No. 1, A
League Table of Child Poverty in Rich Nations 4 (June 2000) (relative poverty de-
fined as children in households with income below 50% of national median).
309 Id. at 18.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
American system, the American Declaration 310 provides that every-
one has the right to preservation of health through "sanitary and
social measures relating to food, clothing, housing and medical care,
to the extent permitted by public and community resources."
311
"Likewise every person has the right to an education that will pre-
pare him to attain a decent life, to raise his standard of living, and
to be a useful member of society. '312 "Every person has a right to
own such private property as meets the essential needs of decent
living and helps to maintain the dignity of the individual and the
home."' 313 Every person who works has the right to "such remuner-
ation as will, in proportion with his capacity and skill, assure him a
standard of living suitable for himself and his family. ' '314 Working is
the duty of every person "so far as his capacity and possibilities
permit." 31
5
The American Declaration sets forth human rights protections
binding on the United States. According to-the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, the American Declaration is "a source of
international obligations" 316 for members of the Organization of
American States. "[TIhe member states of the Organization have
signaled their agreement that the Declaration contains and defines
the fundamental human rights referred to in the Charter. '317 The
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights agrees with this po-
sition.318 Although the United States has contended that the Amer-
ican Declaration does not establish binding obligations,31 9 the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has applied the
310 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX.
O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/I.4 Rev. (1965), reprinted in HENKIN ET AL.,
HUMAN RIGHTS: DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT 367 (2001).
311 Id. at 369 (art. XI).
312 Id. (art. XII).
313 Id. (art. XXIII).
314 Id.at 370 (art. XIV).
315 Id. (art. XXXVII).
316 Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man Within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human
Rights, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-10/89 of
July 14, 1989, Inter-Amer. Ct. H. R. (Ser. A) No. 10, at para. 45 (1989).
317 Id. at para. 43.
318 See Case 9647, Inter-Amer. C.H.R. 147, 159 OEA/Ser. L/V/11.71, doc. 9
rev. 1 (1987) (Roach & Pinkerton).
319 According to the United States, the American Declaration "is not a treaty
and is not binding on the United States. The United States Government does not
agree with the Commission's holding in Case No. 2141 (United States) that the
Declaration acquired binding force with the adoption of the revised OAS Char-
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American Declaration regardless of United States protests. 320 As
discussed above, the United States has failed to ensure that the
working poor are able to attain a decent standard of living. Addi-
tionally, the public educational system frequently fails students by
allowing them to graduate without the skills necessary for decent-
paying jobs. Moreover, the United States has failed to commit ade-
quate resources to social measures relating to food, clothing, hous-
ing and medical care, to the fullest extent of its resources.
321
The European Social Charter, 322 though in no way binding on
the United States, represents the most comprehensive regional doc-
ument dealing with economic, social and cultural rights. 323 The
United States should look to the specific steps proposed for under-
taking obligations under the Charter as illustrations of commit-
ments commensurate with its resources. States parties to the
Charter agree on policy goals regarding attainment of rights and
principles. These rights, enumerated in Part II of the Charter, in-
clude the following:
4. All workers have the right to a fair remuneration
sufficient for a decent standard of living for themselves
and their families.
11. Everyone has the right to benefit from any mea-
sures enabling him to enjoy the highest possible stan-
dard of health attainable.
13. Anyone without adequate resources has the right
to social and medical assistance.
ter.... The Declaration was not drafted with the intent to create legal obliga-
tions .. " Id.
320 See id. at 166. The Commission has held, however, that the American
Convention cannot impose obligations on the United States since it has not ratified
the Convention. Id.
321 See, e.g., New York City Welfare Reform and Human Rights Documenta-
tion Project, supra note 291, at 50-51 (comparing 1999 budget for all food pro-
grams [2.1% of federal budget] to "corporate welfare" [10%] and the military
[41%]).
322 European Social Charter (Revised), Mar. 5,1996 E.T.S. No. 163, reprinted
in HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS: DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT 481 (2001).
323 The sweeping scope of governmental obligations is recognized in the un-
dertakings provision, which provides that each party consider itself bound to a
certain number of enumerated articles and paragraphs of provisions from Part II,
where state obligations on various rights are laid out in detail. Id.
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14. Everyone has the right to benefit from social wel-
fare services.
30. Everyone has the right to protection against pov-
erty and social exclusion.
31. Everyone has the right to housing.
324
To ensure effective exercise of the right to a fair remuneration,
states undertake "to recognise the right of workers to a remunera-
tion such as will give them and their families a decent standard of
living. '325 Parties undertake "to ensure that any person who is with-
out adequate resources and who is unable to secure such resources
either by his own efforts or from other sources, in particular by ben-
efits under a social security scheme, be granted adequate assistance,
and, in case of sickness, the care necessitated by his condition.
... ,326 With regard to the right to housing, the Charter provides:
With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the
right to housing, the Parties undertake to take mea-
sures designed:
1. to promote access to housing of an adequate
standard;
2. to prevent and reduce homelessness with a
view to its gradual elimination;
3. to make the price of housing accessible to those
without adequate resources.
32 7
While the United States does provide housing support for
some, affordable housing remains out of reach for minimum wage
workers, as discussed above. Clearly, the minimum wage is insuffi-
cient to address housing needs. The Charter shows that, contrary to
the United States position, economic rights are not amorphous or
indefinable. If the will exists, a government can establish standards
for basic economic needs and design programs intended to meet
them. That will is lacking in the United States, in part because such
needs are not seen as rights. But as shown above, the Declaration of
Independence establishes the right to pursue happiness, including
324 Id. at 482-83.
325 Id. at 485 (art. 4).
326 Id. at 489 (art. 13).
327 Id. at 496 (art. 31).
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the right to the basic essentials of life necessary to a meaningful
pursuit of happiness.
V. CONCLUSION
While it is unlikely that the narrow judicial view of the Decla-
ration of Independence and the rights encompassed under the pur-
suit of happiness will change, the meaning of the pursuit of
happiness can be an effective rhetorical strategy to mobilize shame
by showing that economic rights are as American as the stars and
stripes or the Declaration of Independence. In the realm of interna-
tional human rights, where rhetoric and political pressure are often
more powerful than any enforcement mechanism, it is helpful to
debunk the myth that economic rights are not human rights. Rather
than being a communist, cold war-era notion, the idea of economic
needs as rights is rooted in the Declaration of Independence. While
it may be impossible to provide a precise definition of happiness, it
is reasonable to conclude that its pursuit requires certain basic eco-
nomic conditions. These economic conditions can be delineated,
and indeed have been enumerated in documents such as the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
In 1944, Roosevelt asked the Congress to implement his eco-
nomic bill of rights, proclaiming, "it is definitely the responsibility
of Congress so to do. ''328 If the judiciary continues to shirk its re-
sponsibility to interpret the Constitution through the lens of the
Declaration of Independence, Congress must fulfill the responsibil-
ity. The interpretation of pursuit of happiness put forth here re-
stores to American democracy a concept lost in the years since the
Declaration of Independence was drafted: basic economic rights are
a necessary part of American democracy.
328 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to the Congress on the State of the Union
(Jan. 11, 1944), available at http://www.udhr.org/history/1-11-44.htm (last visited
Jan. 30, 2003).
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